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THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND 
PRIVATE LAW 
CODY J. JACOBS* 
The Second Amendment, like other federal constitutional rights, is a 
restriction on government power. But what role does the Second 
Amendment have to play—if any—when a private party seeks to limit the 
exercise of Second Amendment rights by invoking private law causes of 
action? Private law—specifically, the law of torts, contracts, and 
property—has often been impacted by constitutional considerations, 
though in seemingly inconsistent ways. The First Amendment places 
limitations on defamation actions and other related torts, and also prevents 
courts from entering injunctions that could be classified as prior restraints. 
On the other hand, the First Amendment plays almost no role in 
contractual litigation, even when courts are called on to enforce 
contractual provisions that directly restrict speech. The Equal Protection 
Clause was famously interpreted to bar the enforcement of a racially 
restrictive covenant in Shelley v. Kraemer, but in the years since, courts 
have largely limited that case to its facts. 
This Article reconciles these disparate outcomes to develop a coherent 
theory of the role constitutional rights play in private law. The Article 
argues that three guideposts inform whether constitutional rights are 
applied to limit private law: (1) whether the private law cause of action 
threatens the core of a constitutional right, (2) whether placing a 
constitutional limitation on private law would impair other constitutional 
rights, and (3) whether the private law imposition on constitutional rights 
was freely bargained for. The Article then applies this framework to the 
individual Second Amendment right recognized in District of Columbia v. 
Heller by examining several areas where the right to keep and bear arms 
could intersect with private law, including negligent entrustment, products 
liability, and trespass. 
 
 *. Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Rick 
Greenstein and Tom Lin for their helpful comments on this article.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3033964 
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INTRODUCTION 
Dick Heller wanted to keep a handgun in his house for self-defense 
but was prevented from doing so by a District of Columbia law banning 
handguns. Believing that the law was unconstitutional, he sued the District 
and ultimately won a landmark decision at the Supreme Court in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, which held that the Second Amendment contains an 
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.1 But what if Mr. 
Heller had lived in an apartment subject to a restrictive covenant banning 
guns? What if he wanted to carry his handgun onto an unwilling business 
owner’s property? What if the manufacturer of Mr. Heller’s handgun was 
sued for selling a defective product? While at first blush it may seem that 
the Second Amendment would have no bearing on these “private” 
restrictions on guns, every single one of them requires the involvement of a 
pubic actor—the court—to give force to these restrictions. 
Does the involvement of a court in enforcing these “private law” 
restrictions on guns automatically mean that each of these restrictions is 
subject to Second Amendment scrutiny?2 Again, the answer is not as clear 
cut as it might seem. The cases dealing with the relationship between other 
constitutional rights and private law have not embraced an across the board 
“court-as-state-actor” theory. Instead, they have produced an inconsistent 
and confusing patchwork of results with no overarching theory to explain 
the different approaches employed when dealing with different 
constitutional rights and different areas of private law. 
This Article will attempt to fill in that gap by developing an 
explanatory theory of the relationship between private law and 
constitutional rights. A close examination of the case law reveals three 
“guideposts” that underlie the courts’ determinations of whether to place 
constitutional limitations on private law in any given context. First, courts 
will only apply constitutional constraints to private law when the private 
law action threatens the core of the constitutional right at issue. Second, 
courts are more reluctant to apply constitutional constraints to private law 
when the application of such a constraint would threaten the constitutional 
 
 1.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008). 
 2.  Private law is “the body of law dealing with private persons and their property and 
relationships.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Of course, the question of what constitutes 
private law as opposed to public law is a fraught one. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Private Law in 
the Gaps, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1689, 1703 (2014). This article defines private law as concerning tort, 
contract, and property law doctrines, irrespective of whether the source of those doctrines in any given 
situation happens to be common law or statute. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 
80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 517 (1985). 
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rights of others. Third, courts rarely apply constitutional constraints to 
contracts and other voluntary agreements. This Article will use the Second 
Amendment to demonstrate how these guideposts might be applied in 
several areas where Second Amendment rights and private law are likely to 
intersect. 
Part I of this Article explores the way other individual constitutional 
rights have played a role in private law litigation. Part II proposes a 
theoretical framework—the Core Right Theory—that explains the 
seemingly disparate ways other rights have been incorporated into private 
law litigation. Part III elucidates what the core of the Second Amendment 
right is through a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller and 
of the Second Amendment doctrine that has developed in the lower courts 
following that decision. Part IV discusses several potential areas where the 
Second Amendment could be implicated in private law litigation and 
applies the Core Right Theory to sketch out how courts might approach 
those issues. 
I.  INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW: 
A TANGLED PATCHWORK 
The relationship between individual constitutional rights and private 
law has always been a messy one. Individual constitutional rights were 
traditionally thought to serve only as checks on direct exercises of 
government power, and had no bearing whatsoever on private law 
litigation.3 However, starting in the middle of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court began to expand the scope of constitutional rights to place 
limits on private law in some areas. But this expansion has been far from 
uniform. Torts imposing liability based on speech and injunctive relief that 
targets speech have been given serious constitutional limitations. 
Nevertheless, contractual obligations limiting speech have remained 
relatively free from First Amendment scrutiny. Likewise, although a few 
prominent cases have suggested otherwise, courts have been fairly reluctant 
to find that the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause contain 
consequential limitations on private property rights. 
A.  FREE SPEECH, DEFAMATION, AND RELATED INTENTIONAL TORTS 
Perhaps the most famous area where the Supreme Court has explicitly 
placed constitutional limitations on litigation between private parties is in 
 
 3.  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (noting that in 
the Lochner era, the common law was thought of as a “part of nature rather than a legal construct”). 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT & PRIVATE LAW [JACOBS SSRN].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/2017  1:18 PM 
2017] THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND PRIVATE LAW 949 
the context of actions for defamation.4 The torts of libel and slander existed 
at common law long before the First Amendment was ratified.5 And, for 
over a century after the First Amendment was ratified, there was no 
suggestion that the Amendment did anything to alter these torts even 
though liability was triggered by the defendant’s speech.6 
The Supreme Court changed that dramatically in New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan.7 In that case, a public official in Alabama sued the New York 
Times and several civil rights leaders for libel in Alabama state court based 
on an allegedly defamatory advertisement the Times published, which 
criticized the official’s handling of civil rights protests in Montgomery.8 
The jury returned a hefty verdict for the plaintiff after being instructed by 
the trial judge that the statements in the advertisement were libel per se and 
that no proof of intentional falsity was required.9 The Supreme Court of 
Alabama upheld the jury verdict and rejected the defendants’ argument that 
the jury instructions violated the First Amendment.10 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the First Amendment 
limited libel actions by requiring that—when the plaintiff is a public 
figure—the plaintiff must prove that the allegedly defamatory material was 
published by the defendant with “‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”11 
The Court rejected any distinction between libel actions between private 
parties and other kinds of state action: 
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama 
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose 
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. 
It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action . . . . The test 
 
 4.  Defamation refers to two separate torts: libel and slander. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 568 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).     
 5.  See, e.g., Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind 
the Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 42 (1985).  
 6.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1656 (2009). But see Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original 
Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 251 (2010) (arguing that 
courts and commentators did understand tort actions as state action for purposes of the First 
Amendment and state constitutional analogues at the time of the founding, but that they simply 
considered defamation to be outside the scope of the First Amendment). 
 7.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964). 
 8.  Id. at 256–65. 
 9.  Id. The jury awarded $500,000 in damages against the defendants, which is nearly $4 
million in today’s dollars. See U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2017). 
 10.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 40 (Ala. 1962). 
 11.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.  
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is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the 
form, whether such power has in fact been exercised. . . . What a State 
may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is 
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.12 
In the years following Sullivan, the Court extended the protection of 
the actual malice requirement to situations where the defamation plaintiff is 
any “public figure,” even if they are not a public official.13 Although the 
Court declined to extend the full protection of Sullivan to suits involving 
non-public-figure plaintiffs, it did hold that the First Amendment requires 
such plaintiffs to prove some sort of fault on the part of the defendant in 
publishing the defamatory statement where the statement involves a matter 
of public concern,14 displacing the common law rule of strict liability.15 
The Court also held that non-public-figure plaintiffs could not recover 
punitive or presumed damages16 for defamation unless they satisfied the 
Sullivan actual malice standard.17 The Court also required that where the 
allegedly defamatory speech deals with a matter of public concern, the 
burden of proof for showing falsity must be on the plaintiff.18 Finally, the 
Court established that the First Amendment requires appellate courts to 
undertake an independent examination of whether the actual malice test is 
satisfied when reviewing a trial court’s judgment in a defamation case 
where that standard applies.19  
The scope of other intentional torts involving speech has also been 
limited by the First Amendment. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the 
Court held that a public figure plaintiff could not recover damages for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on speech unless the 
underlying speech contained a false statement of fact made with actual 
malice.20 Similarly, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the court held that actual malice 
was also required in false light type actions involving issues of public 
concern.21 And, in Snyder v. Phelps, the court refused to allow recovery on 
claims for intentional inflection of emotional distress and intrusion upon 
 
 12.  Id. at 265, 277 (citations omitted). 
 13.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335 & n.7 (1974). 
 14.  See id. at 347. 
 15.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 16.  Presumed damages are damages that are recoverable for defamation without any proof of 
actual loss. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. 
 17.  See id. at 348–50. 
 18.  See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). 
 19.  See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685–86 (1989); Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984).  
 20.  Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).  
 21.  Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967). 
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seclusion based on activities associated with picketing in a public space.22 
The Court has also limited the use of the tort of public disclosure of private 
facts, foreclosing the imposition of liability where the facts disclosed 
appear in a public record.23 
However, not all torts involving speech have been subject to First 
Amendment restrictions. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 
the Court held that the First Amendment placed no limitation on actions for 
the appropriation of the right of publicity.24 The Court noted that while 
actions for defamation and false light sought to silence speech, actions for 
appropriation of the right of publicity were simply about “who gets to do 
the publishing.”25 Thus, the Court concluded that the performer of a human 
cannonball act could recover against a news station that broadcast his entire 
act without compensating him.26 
B.  FREE SPEECH AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
The First Amendment also places limits on the kinds of equitable 
relief available to prevailing parties in private law litigation. Injunctions 
that prohibit defendants from engaging in speech can, in some 
circumstances, be classified by courts as prior restraints, and therefore be 
subjected to exacting First Amendment scrutiny.27 “The term prior restraint 
is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain 
communications when issued in advance of the time that such 
communications are to occur.”28 Although the Supreme Court has never 
established the specific standard that applies to the review of prior 
restraints,29 it has held that such restraints carry “a ‘heavy presumption’ 
against [their] constitutional validity” and that the party attempting to 
justify the restraint “carries a heavy burden.”30 
In the private law context, concerns about prior restraints most often 
 
 22.  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456, 460 (2011). 
 23.  See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975). 
 24.  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).  
 25.  Id. at 573. The court also noted that these actions preserved similar economic interests to 
actions for copyright infringement, which posed no First Amendment problem. See id. at 575–77. 
 26.  Id. at 578. 
 27.  See, e.g., Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1241 (2000) (“[Court] [o]rders which 
restrict or preclude a citizen from speaking in advance are known as ‘prior restraints,’ and are 
disfavored and presumptively invalid.”) (citing Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 
(1971)). 
 28.  E.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (emphasis, citation, and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 29.  See, e.g., J.Q. Office Equip. of Omaha, Inc. v. Sullivan, 432 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Neb. 1988). 
 30.  Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citations omitted). 
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arise in lawsuits involving defamation, harassment, or trade secrets where 
the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to prevent the defendant from 
continuing to engage in offending conduct that involves at least some 
element of speech. The level of scrutiny courts apply to such injunctions 
varies depending primarily on two factors: (1) whether the injunction is 
content-based, and (2) whether the injunction forbids speech on a matter of 
public concern. Speech restrictive injunctions which are content-based are 
subject to strict scrutiny,31 while injunctions that are not content-based are 
subject to a lesser standard akin to intermediate scrutiny.32 Although the 
role it plays in the analysis is less clear, courts are also less likely to grant 
injunctive relief that would suppress speech on matters of public concern. 
The court’s purpose in adopting the injunction is the controlling 
consideration in determining content neutrality.33 If the injunction was 
adopted for a purpose other than suppressing the message the speaker 
intended to convey, it is content neutral.34 In DVD Copy Control 
Association, Inc. v. Bunner, the Supreme Court of California upheld an 
injunction preventing the publication of proprietary computer code that was 
found to be a trade secret of the plaintiff.35 The court reasoned that the 
communication of the computer code was singled out not because of its 
message, but because of the plaintiff’s property interest in the code.36 The 
court went on to find that the injunction served a significant government 
interest—allowing trade secret owners to “reap the fruits of [their] own 
labor”—and that the injunction burdened no more speech than necessary to 
further that purpose, since the only way to protect trade secrets is to prevent 
them from becoming public.37 Similarly, in Rew v. Bergstrom, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals justified a protective order barring the 
defendant from contacting the plaintiff, a domestic violence victim, 
“because it restrict[ed] contact with the abuse victim initiated by the 
abusing party without regard for the message the abusing party intend[ed] 
 
 31.  Strict scrutiny requires that the injunction be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest. See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 862 (2009).  
 32.  See DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 877 (2003). The standard for 
reviewing content-neutral injunctions that burden speech asks whether the injunction “burden[s] no 
more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citation omitted). 
 33.  See Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 877. 
 34.  See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763; Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 877. 
 35.  See Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 864, 885.  
 36.  See id. at 877. See also In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(upholding injunction preventing the dissemination of proprietary company documents illegally 
retained after discovery because “[t]he injunction [was] justified not by reference to the content of the 
covered documents, but rather by their unlawful acquisition.”). 
 37.  Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 880–81 (citations omitted). 
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to express.”38 Courts have been similarly willing to enter content-neutral 
injunctions restricting speech in the copyright context39 and in the context 
of harassment by protesters.40 
By contrast, in Franklin Chalfont Associates v. Kalikow, a 
Pennsylvania court refused to uphold an injunction preventing home 
owners who were dissatisfied with the real estate developer who sold them 
their homes from criticizing his business through picketing, leafleting, and 
displaying signs in other ways.41 The developer alleged that the home 
owners’ activities constituted tortious interference with his business and 
that the injunction was necessary to prevent that interference and to protect 
the developer and his customers from the defendants’ “offensive” 
signage.42 The court rejected those arguments noting that “the 
injunction . . . was directed at the content rather than the manner of 
appellants’ speech” because it only prevented the home owners from 
engaging in “speech and other expressive conduct which [was] critical of 
[the developer]. It [was] directed against the ideas expressed because of the 
detrimental impact which the communication of those ideas . . . had upon 
[the developer].”43 Similarly, in Shang Jen Lo v. Shu Ping Chan, the 
California Court of Appeals reversed an injunction preventing disgruntled 
former church parishioners “from approaching, yelling out, or calling out to 
parishioners concerning respondent or other church officials from [a 
nearby] parking lot on any day church services are held” because the court 
found it to be a content-based restriction on speech, since it solely restricted 
speech that concerned the church.44 
 
 38.  Rew v. Bergstrom, 812 N.W.2d 832, 838 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
845 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2014). 
 39.  See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536 (1987) 
(upholding injunction prohibiting certain uses of the word “Olympic” because any “restrictions on 
expressive speech” were “incidental” to the primary purpose of “encouraging and rewarding the [U.S. 
Olympic Committee’s] activities.”). 
 40.  See, e.g., Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 63 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The 
injunction at issue here is content-neutral. . . . The challenged sections of the injunction make no 
mention whatsoever of abortion or any other substantive issue—they merely restrict the volume, 
location, timing, and violent or intimidating nature of his expressive activity.”); Murray v. Lawson, 649 
A.2d 1253, 1263 (N.J. 1994) (upholding an injunction preventing picketing near the home of a doctor 
who provided abortions on the ground that “the court granted it to protect the [doctor and his family] 
from targeted picketing that inherently and offensively interfered with their residential privacy” rather 
than to suppress the message of the protesters). 
 41.  Franklin Chalfont Assocs. v. Kalikow, 573 A.2d 550, 550–52, 557–58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).  
 42.  Id. at 554–57. 
 43.  Id. at 557 (emphasis omitted). 
 44.  Shang Jen Lo v. Shu Ping Chan, Nos. B261883, B261885, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
9426, at *15 (Dec. 30, 2015). See also, e.g., Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. L.A. Times Commc’ns 
LLC, 239 Cal. App. 4th 808, 824 (2015) (finding proposed injunction against the release of allegedly 
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Courts have also shown a reluctance to enter or uphold injunctions 
that burden speech on matters of public concern. In Rain CII Carbon, LLC 
v. Kurczy, for example, a federal district court refused to enjoin the release 
by a journalist of certain financial information that the plaintiff—a major 
chemical company—alleged were trade secrets.45 The court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that trade secrets were inherently matters of purely 
private concern, finding that the financials of a major chemical company 
were a matter in which the public would have important interests.46 By 
contrast, in Evilsizor v. Sweeney, the California Court of Appeal upheld an 
injunction preventing a man from publishing text messages obtained from 
his wife’s phone in order to harass her.47 The court faulted the defendant 
for failing to “identif[y] any public concern in [his wife’s] text messages 
and other information that he surreptitiously took from her phones.”48 
The focus on whether speech restricting injunctions in private law 
litigation are content-neutral and whether they involve matters of public 
concern mirrors the focus on these issues in other aspects of First 
Amendment doctrine. The practice of distinguishing between content-
neutral and content-based restrictions on speech and applying greater 
scrutiny to the latter has been called “the keystone of First Amendment 
law.”49 This is because “the fundamental rule of protection under the First 
Amendment” is that “a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of 
his own message,” and content-based restrictions on speech threaten that 
choice.50 Similarly, the question of whether a restriction impacts speech on 
 
confidential information about police department employees not “‘content-neutral’ at all); Animal 
Rights Found. of Fla., Inc. v. Siegel, 867 So. 2d 451, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing 
injunction in tortious interference with business relationships case that prevented an animal rights group 
from making certain specific statements criticizing the plaintiff). 
 45.  Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. Kurczy, No. 12-2014, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116865, at *8–9 
(E.D. La. Aug. 20, 2012).  
 46.  Id. at *5. See also New.net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1085–86 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (finding that a software company’s labeling of another company’s product as spyware was 
speech on a matter of public concern—internet privacy—and refusing to enjoin that speech in an action 
alleging libel and several business torts); VI 4D, LLLP v. Crucians in Focus, Inc., 57 V.I. 143, 160 
(Super. Ct. 2012) (refusing to enjoin the release of trade secrets obtained from a confidential executive 
summary submitted to a government agency in connection with an application for tax benefits, on the 
grounds that the application dealt with an issue of public concern). 
 47.  Evilsizor v. Sweeney (In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney), 237 Cal. App. 4th 1416, 
1428 (2015).  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996). See also Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for 
Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1263 n.2 (2014) 
(collecting sources making similar claims). 
 50.  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). See 
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matters of public concern has often been important to the Supreme Court in 
determining the validity of speech restrictions under the First Amendment. 
As the Court has observed on several occasions, “speech on public issues 
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and 
is entitled to special protection” because “[s]peech on matters of public 
concern . . . is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.”51 By 
contrast, “where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First 
Amendment protections are often less rigorous” because such restrictions 
pose less of a “threat to the free and robust debate of public issues.”52 
C.  FREE SPEECH AND CONTRACTS 
In stark contrast with the robust role the First Amendment plays in tort 
actions, the Supreme Court has said relatively little about the role the First 
Amendment may play, if any, in regulating contractual obligations.53 In 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Supreme Court held that a cause of action 
for promissory estoppel based on a newspaper’s decision to break a 
promise by revealing the identity of a confidential source could constitute 
state action subject to First Amendment restrictions.54 The Court reasoned: 
[I]f Cohen could recover at all it would be on the theory of promissory 
estoppel, a state-law doctrine which, in the absence of a contract, creates 
obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties. These legal 
obligations would be enforced through the official power of the 
Minnesota courts. Under our cases, that is enough to constitute “state 
action” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 
The Court’s reasoning here is a bit cryptic in terms of what it means 
for the broader universe of contractual claims that may implicate the First 
Amendment. Some have argued that claims of promissory estoppel and 
breach of contract are sufficiently similar to justify extending the logic of 
Cohen to contract claims.56 Others have argued that the Court’s dicta 
mentioning the “absence of a contract” means that the logic of Cohen does 
not extend to contract claims where there are contractual obligations 
 
also Kreimer, supra note 49, at 1316 (“[S]trong content neutrality provides robust political bulwarks for 
free expression.”). 
 51.  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 52.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 53.  See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 350 (1998). 
 54.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991).  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  See Garfield, supra note 53, at 350–52. 
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“explicitly assumed by the parties.”57 
The argument over the meaning of this passage is largely irrelevant in 
practice because Cohen’s purported “application” of the First Amendment 
was so toothless as to render it virtually irrelevant in contract actions.58 The 
Court found that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is “a law of 
general applicability” that “does not target or single out the press” the First 
Amendment did not “forbid its application to the press.”59 Thus, the Court 
found no constitutional issue with the promissory estoppel action in that 
case.60 
This explanation is less than satisfying since the common law causes 
of action for defamation and other torts are also laws of general 
applicability.61 Why then, does the First Amendment place such strict 
restrictions on torts that impact speech but take such a hands-off approach 
to contracts? One plausible explanation for this differential treatment is that 
the consensual nature of a contractual agreement operates essentially as a 
waiver of whatever First Amendment rights would otherwise be implicated 
by lawsuits arising out of contracts. In other words, lawsuits to enforce 
contracts may constitute state action, but the state is free to suppress speech 
where the defendant has consented to the suppression of that speech 
through a contract (or, as in Cohen, through a legally enforceable promise). 
Many scholars and courts have embraced this approach to 
understanding the distinction between Cohen and cases like Sullivan.62 
 
 57.  Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of 
Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 63–65 (1995). See also JW & JJ Entm’t, LLC v. Sandler, No. 8:13-CV-
01609-AW, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138107, at *10 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2013) (“Although court enforcement of 
state law doctrines in a manner alleged to violate the First Amendment may constitute governmental 
action, a court’s adverse enforcement of contractual obligations that a party explicitly assumes does not 
constitute governmental action.”). 
 58.  See Solove & Richards, supra note 6, at 1661–63.  
 59.  Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669. 
 60.  Id. at 671–72. 
 61.  See Solove & Richards, supra note 6, at 1675 (“[T]he generally applicable law approach 
does not explain the difference in treatment between tort and contract, because the approach provides 
no explanation why some bodies of law are defined at a greater level of generality than others.”). 
Indeed, some courts have taken Cohen as an invitation to subject activities that would ordinarily be 
subject to First Amendment protection to non-defamation tort liability, on the theory that such torts are 
also “generally applicable laws.” See, e.g., Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp. 392, 404 (W.D. Tex. 
1996) (applying the Cohen “law of general applicability” standard to a negligence action against media 
defendants arising out of newsgathering activities); Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock A Right: 
Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1135, 1191–1200 (1997) (collecting cases relying on the “law of general applicability” 
language to subject newsgathering activities to tort liability). 
 62.  See, e.g., Perricone v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 681–82 (Conn. 2009); Garfield, supra note 
53, at 354–55; Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages for Newsgathering Torts and 
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However, some have questioned this reasoning on the grounds that it is 
inconsistent with Supreme Court doctrine dealing with contracts private 
parties make directly with the government that involve the waiver of 
constitutional rights.63 In what has become known as the unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine, the Court has repeatedly held that the First 
Amendment places limits on the government’s ability to extract waivers of 
constitutional rights in agreements it makes with private parties, even when 
a private party would voluntarily agree to such a waiver.64 If First 
Amendment rights cannot be completely waived in a contract with the 
government, why can they be waived in other contracts? 
The best answer to this question is that the government has unique 
powers that give it an inherent bargaining advantage that other parties 
simply do not have.65 As the Court has put it in explaining the 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, “[i]f the government could deny a 
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or 
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized 
and inhibited.”66 This is not true of other contracting parties, who can 
simply find someone else to bargain with if the terms are not agreeable. Of 
course, there are certainly arguments to be made against that distinction, 
especially in situations where the private party seeking the waiver of free 
speech rights has a vast bargaining power advantage over the other private 
party.67 Nevertheless, the coercion rationale does explain why the Court on 
the one hand subjects private contracts involving speech to virtually no 
constitutional scrutiny, while on the other hand carefully restricts the 
government’s ability to extract speech-limiting concessions from the 
 
the Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV. 507, 557–58 (1998); Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop 
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057, 1061 (2000). See also Solove & 
Richards, supra note 6, at 1675–76 (“One of the most widely accepted approaches for determining 
when civil liability triggers the First Amendment is to look to whether a person has consented to the 
waiver of her First Amendment rights.”). 
 63.  See Solove & Richards, supra note 6, at 1678. 
 64.  See id. at 1678–79 & n.154 (collecting cases). 
 65.  See, e.g., Solove & Richards, supra note 6, at 1679 (“Treating the government and private 
parties as equivalent overlooks the danger that the government could use its vast resources to buy up 
constitutional rights.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1451 (1989) (“In several respects, government poses greater danger than private parties of coercion, 
however defined.”). 
 66.  O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 717 (1996) (quotations and 
citations omitted).  
 67.  For example, companies often force employees to sign non-disclosure agreements as a 
condition of employment—a situation where most potential employees have little, if any, bargaining 
leverage. See Garfield, supra note 53, at 285–86. 
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private parties with which it bargains. 
D.  FREE SPEECH AND TRESPASS 
Like in the tort context, in the property context the Court took a 
seemingly radical step toward placing First Amendment restrictions on 
private law in a famous mid-twentieth-century case, Marsh v. Alabama.68 
However, unlike the watershed decision in Sullivan, Marsh proved to be 
the high-water mark of the Court’s willingness to limit private property 
owners’ ability to curtail free speech. 
In Marsh, the Court reviewed the criminal trespass conviction of a 
member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses who was distributing literature on the 
sidewalks of Chickasaw, Alabama.69 Chickasaw was a “company town” 
where all the property, including the streets, sidewalks, and utilities, were 
owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Company.70 The Court held that, despite 
the town’s status as private property, the defendant’s conduct was 
nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.71 The Court reasoned that: 
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by 
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by 
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. Thus, the 
owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not 
operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are 
built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their 
operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state 
regulation.72 
Although Marsh involved a prosecution for criminal trespass, the 
restrictions it announced on the exclusion of disfavored speakers from 
certain kinds of private property applied equally to efforts to do so through 
civil trespass suits.73 
The Court built on Marsh twenty-four years later in Amalgamated 
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.74 In that 
 
 68.  Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946). 
 69.  Id. at 502–04. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 506–09. 
 72.  Id. at 506. 
 73.  See, e.g., Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ Union, Local 
No. 31, 394 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. 1964) (relying on Marsh to deny relief to the owner of a shopping 
center in a trespass action against union protesters); Blue Ridge Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Schleininger, 432 
S.W.2d 610, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (same).  
 74.  Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 308 
(1968), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
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case, the Court reversed an injunction preventing a union from picketing in 
front of a privately owned shopping center containing a grocery store the 
union felt was treating workers unfairly.75 The Court held that the shopping 
center bore “striking similarities” to the company town in Marsh in that 
both were relatively large commercial areas to which the general public had 
unrestricted access.76 However, just a few years later, the Court backed 
away from Marsh and Logan Valley. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the Court 
reversed an injunction allowing groups opposed to the Vietnam War to pass 
out leaflets at a privately owned shopping center against the will of the 
owners.77 The Court distinguished Logan Valley on the grounds that the 
picketing in that case involved a matter directly related to the operation of 
the store.78 However, the Court’s language made clear that it was skeptical 
of the entire premise of Logan Valley. For example, it noted with alarm that 
the “open to the public” rationale “would apply in varying degrees to most 
retail stores and service establishments across the country” and that private 
property does not “lose its private character merely because the public is 
generally invited to use it for designated purposes.”79 
A few Terms later, in Hudgens v. NLRB, the Court took the next step 
and explicitly overruled Logan Valley.80 The Court did not overrule Marsh 
but instead distinguished the company town in Marsh from the shopping 
centers in these later cases because “the owner of the company town was 
performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of 
the State” while the shopping center owners were not.81 Since Hudgens, it 
has been well settled that there are essentially no federal82 constitutional 
limits on what speakers and messages private property owners can exclude 
from their property, whether the exclusion is accomplished through 
criminal or civil means.83 
 
 75.  Id. at 325. 
 76.  Id. at 318–19. 
 77.  Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561–62, 569 (1972). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 565–66, 596.  
 80.  Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).  
 81.  Id. at 519 (quotations and citation omitted). 
 82.  A few state constitutional free speech provisions have been interpreted to follow some 
version of the Logan Valley rule. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 
1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 
A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994). 
 83.  The only exceptions have come in cases where the private property at issue was specifically 
designated for public use independent of its business-related use, either by historical practice or by 
explicit agreement with government authorities. See, e.g., Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint 
Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 943–44, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2001) (extending First Amendment 
protection to protesters on a privately owned sidewalk that the owner was required to open to the public 
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Why did First Amendment restrictions on defamation actions become 
entrenched while First Amendment restrictions on trespass actions proved 
so fleeting? Part of the answer may lie in the Court’s concern that 
recognizing a First Amendment right to speak on others’ property threatens 
other constitutional interests—namely the rights of property owners under 
the Fifth Amendment.84 The Court’s desire to provide breathing space for 
the exercise of another constitutional right—a concern not present in the 
defamation context85—at least partially explains why it was more reluctant 
to use the First Amendment to limit trespass actions.86 However, the 
continuing validity of Marsh and the Court’s willingness to allow state 
constitutional free speech guarantees to limit trespass actions87 show that 
concern for property rights does not provide a complete explanation. 
Another factor that helps fill this gap are the important differences 
between the First Amendment interests threatened by defamation torts and 
trespass actions. As discussed in Part I.B, First Amendment doctrine has 
long made a distinction between mere “time, place, and manner” 
restrictions that simply tell speakers where and when they can speak and 
“content-based” restrictions, which restrict what a speaker can speak 
about.88 Laws falling into the latter category are generally subject to much 
more rigorous scrutiny than laws in the former category.89 Defamation 
actions are, in essence, content-based restrictions on speech; they punish a 
speaker for speaking about a particular subject—the person being 
 
as a condition of constructing its business, and collecting similar cases). 
 84.  See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567–68 (1972) (noting that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and prohibition on taking “private property . . . for public use, 
without just compensation” were “relevant to this case,” and that “[a]lthough accommodations between 
the values protected by [the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments] are sometimes necessary . . . this 
Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech 
on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”). 
 85.  Although some countries have a constitutional right associated with reputational harm, the 
United States does not. See Mark Tushnet, New York Times v. Sullivan Around the World, 66 ALA. L. 
REV. 337, 352–53 (2014) (“As a result, in other constitutional systems, libel law involves a conflict 
between constitutional rights, and the courts’ task is to achieve the best accommodation of rights that 
exist on the same conceptual plane. In contrast, in the United States the right to reputation is a mere 
social interest, no different from any other legislatively-favored value but conceptually always 
subordinated to constitutional rights.”) 
 86.  See Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 570 (“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private 
property owners, as well as the First Amendment rights of all citizens, must be respected and protected. 
The Framers of the Constitution certainly did not think these fundamental rights of a free society are 
incompatible with each other.”). 
 87.  See Robins, 447 U.S. at 80–85. 
 88.  See, e.g., 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 957 (2017). 
 89.  See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). 
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defamed.90 
By contrast, the content neutrality question is more complex in a 
trespass action. A property owner may use trespass actions to exclude 
speakers with a particular message while allowing other speakers to 
remain. In that sense, trespass actions look like content-based restrictions 
on speech. However, because a private property owner can only control his 
or her own property, excluded speakers are left with plenty of other places 
to get their message out, making trespass actions seem much more like a 
time, place, and manner restriction.91 In a defamation action, by contrast, 
the speaker will be punished for speaking about the person being defamed 
no matter where the speech occurs. 
To be sure, time, place, and manner restrictions imposed by the 
government ordinarily cannot discriminate based on subject matter even if 
they leave ample alternative channels for speech about that subject.92  But, 
when combined with the Court’s concern for the constitutional rights of 
private property owners, the fact that trespass actions do not completely 
snuff out speech based on its content provides a helpful explanatory tool 
for understanding the Court’s approach. 
E.  EQUAL PROTECTION, COVENANTS, WILLS, AND TRUSTS 
As described above, the Court’s application of the First Amendment to 
private law has been—at best—somewhat inconsistent. Things get even 
more convoluted when the Court’s approach to applying the Equal 
Protection Clause to private law is considered. In Shelley v. Kraemer,93 the 
Court confronted the issue of how the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to racially restrictive covenants—that is, 
covenants that prevent the sale of land to, or occupation of land by, racial 
minorities.94 The Court’s answer was surprising: the covenant itself is a 
private matter that does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, but any 
attempt to enforce the covenant in court does implicate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This rationale would potentially implicate the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and perhaps other constitutional provisions) in virtually every 
 
 90.  See supra Part I.B. 
 91.  A key factor in the Court’s test for evaluating time, place, and manner restrictions imposed 
by the government in public forums is whether or not the restrictions “leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication.” E.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (citation omitted). 
 92.  See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 957. 
 93.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 1 (1948). 
 94.  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No state shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1. 
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contract, since contracts are only effective to the extent they are 
enforceable.95 However, as discussed below, the Supreme Court and lower 
courts have declined to take Shelley nearly so far—leaving generations of 
scholars to attempt to rationalize this apparent outlier. 
In Shelley, white landowners in two consolidated cases were 
attempting to enforce racially restrictive covenants against black people 
who purchased land allegedly subject to the covenants.96 The black 
purchasers argued that the enforcement of the covenants violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, while the land owners argued that the private covenants 
were not subject to any constitutional restrictions.97 The Court first held, 
that “[s]o long as [racially restrictive covenants are] effectuated by 
voluntary adherence to their terms . . . there has been no action by the State 
and the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated.”98 However, 
the Court found that here, there was “action by the state” in the form of the 
court orders the landowners sought to enforce the covenants.99 
The Court reasoned that “but for the active intervention of the state 
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have 
been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint.”100 The 
Court rejected the argument that the discriminatory policy’s source—a 
private agreement—had any impact on the analysis, finding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not “ineffective simply because the particular 
pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined 
initially by the terms of a private agreement.”101 The Court ended its 
analysis by noting that: 
Whatever else the framers [of the Fourteenth Amendment] sought to 
achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern was the 
establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political 
rights and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on 
the part of the States based on considerations of race or color.102 
As many scholars have pointed out, the apparent breadth of Shelley’s 
 
 95.  See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New 
Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 453 (2007) (“Shelley’s approach, ‘consistently applied, would require 
individuals to conform their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever individuals might 
later seek the security of judicial enforcement, as is often the case.’”) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 96.  Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4–8. 
 97.  Id. at 7–8, 14. 
 98.  Id. at 13.  
 99.  Id. at 19. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 20. 
 102.  Id. at 23. 
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holding is striking and perhaps even disturbing.103 Virtually all private 
decisions are in some way or another, only possible because of the threat of 
some kind of judicial enforcement of those decisions.104 Thus, taken to its 
logical conclusion, Shelley’s rationale would subject nearly all private 
decision-making to constitutional constraints.105 
Of course, as the discussion above of the First Amendment’s 
application to contract and trespass actions demonstrates, the Supreme 
Court and lower courts have not followed Shelley to its logical conclusion 
in all areas of constitutional law.106 In fact, courts have not taken this broad 
view of Shelley even in the limited context of private law cases involving 
the Equal Protection Clause.107 Although a few years later, in Barrows v. 
Jackson, the Court applied its holding in Shelley to bar a lawsuit for 
damages against a white person for violating a racially restrictive covenant 
by selling his home to a non-white person, in subsequent years the Court 
has all but ignored Shelley, even in cases involving racial discrimination.108 
In fact, the Court has not applied Shelley to any private law dispute at all in 
the more than sixty years since Barrows was decided. 
Lower courts have also been reluctant to expand Shelley or even take 
its reasoning at face value.109 For example, in Shapira v. Union National 
Bank, an Ohio court found no constitutional problem with the enforcement 
of a will provision conditioning the receipt of certain property on the 
testator’s son marrying a Jewish person.110 The court reasoned that unlike 
the complete deprivation of the ability to buy the property in Shelley, the 
 
 103.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 524–25; Thomas F. Guernsey, The Mentally 
Retarded and Private Restrictive Covenants, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 421, 442–43 (1984); Thomas P. 
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1109 (1960); Rosen, supra note 95, at 
453; Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for Keeping; A Time for 
Throwing Away”?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 82–84 (1998). See also Darrell A.H. Miller, State Domas, 
Neutral Principles, and the Möbius of State Action, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 967, 972 & n.28 (2008) (“The 
problem with Shelley—as noted even by those who agreed with its result—was the potentially 
intolerable breadth of the reasoning.”) (collecting sources). 
 104.  See Saxer, supra note 103, at 101 (“For example, if I decide to invite only women to my 
house for a Tupperware party and three men walk into my house uninvited, I cannot call the sheriff to 
have them removed as trespassers without risking liability for violating their rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”). 
 105.  See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 524–25.  
 106.  See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 95, at 459–60. 
 107.  See, e.g., Guernsey, supra note 103, at 442 (noting “the Supreme Court’s reluctance since 
Shelley to expand its holding beyond restrictive covenants having racial overtones”). 
 108.  See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254, 260 (1953); Rosen, supra note 95, at 462–66 
(describing the Court’s reluctance to apply Shelley’s rationale in several cases involving racial 
discrimination).  
 109.  See Rosen, supra note 95 at 469. 
 110.  Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 825–28 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974). 
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court’s decision to enforce the will would not completely deprive the son of 
the right to marry.111 The court observed that “[i]f the . . . aid of this court 
were sought to enjoin [the son’s] marrying a non-Jewish girl, then the 
doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer would be applicable . . . .”112 However, this 
reasoning makes little sense. Just as the Shapira court noted the son had no 
right to inherit anything at all, neither did the property purchasers in Shelley 
have any right to purchase or own property.113 Rather, the right that was 
violated in Shelley was the right to have an equal opportunity to purchase 
property—a right which enforcing the covenant would clearly have 
violated. Similarly, the right at issue in Shapira was the son’s right to the 
same opportunity to inherit his father’s property irrespective of his choice 
of who to marry. Nevertheless, Shapira expresses the majority rule that 
discriminatory will or trust provisions are generally valid.114 Other courts 
have been similarly skeptical of using Shelley to apply the Equal Protection 
Clause in private law disputes, including in cases involving the use of 
restrictive covenants to bar the construction of churches and the 
construction of group homes for the elderly and disabled.115 
The few courts that have applied Shelley have done so primarily in 
situations involving race discrimination or where a neutral covenant is 
enforced in a discriminatory manner.116 In Spencer v. Flint Memorial Park 
 
 111.  Id. at 827–28. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See id. at 828. 
 114.  See Aaron H. Kaplan, Note, The “Jewish Clause” and Public Policy: Preserving the 
Testamentary Right to Oppose Religious Intermarriage, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 311 (2010). 
 115.  See, e.g., Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 259–60 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(refusing to apply Shelley to the enforcement of a restrictive covenant barring anything other than single 
family homes against a group home for the elderly because the covenant was “facially neutral”); 
Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 234–35 (Mass. 1955) (upholding will provision barring son from 
receiving property if he marries a non-Jewish person); Ginsberg v. Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 358 
N.Y.S.2d 477, 481–82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), (upholding the use against religious institutions of a 
restrictive covenant barring non-residential property use), aff’d, 325 N.E.2d 876 (1975); Shaver v. 
Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Tex. App. 1981) (upholding “single family home” covenant since 
allowing the construction of a group home for the disabled would give “preferred treatment to the 
handicapped”); Ireland v. Bible Baptist Church, 480 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (upholding 
restrictive covenant barring the construction of churches because it “applied equally to churches of all 
denominations and faiths”). But see Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747, 751–53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) 
(upholding restrictive covenant barring persons under twenty-one from a development but only after 
concluding that the restriction was “reasonably related to a legitimate purpose”).  
 116.  See, e.g., Spencer v. Flint Mem’l Park Ass’n, 144 N.W.2d 622, 628–30 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1966); W. Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1969). See also 
White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351–52 (Fla. 1979) (“[W]e find the restriction 
against children under the age of twelve reasonably related to a lawful objective, but under the 
circumstances of this case the selective and arbitrary manner of enforcement is another issue.”); Preston 
Tower Condo. Ass’n v. S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding 
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Association, the court refused to enforce a cemetery’s rule that would have 
prohibited the holder of burial rights from burying a non-white person in 
the cemetery.117 The court found that Shelley’s analysis applied with equal 
force to the enforcement of this discriminatory restriction as it did to 
restrictive real property covenants.118 Interestingly, the court went out of its 
way to note that it is “absolutely clear that [the court’s] conclusion in no 
way prevents cemeteries maintained by a particular religious faith from 
restricting burial rights to members of that faith,” since “[f]rom time 
immemorial cemeteries and interment in them have had a close 
identification with religion.”119 In West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, the 
court refused to enforce a covenant forbidding the non-residential use of 
certain property against a church where the holders of the covenant had 
attempted to enforce the covenant only against certain churches and not 
others.120 
Scholars who maintain that Shelley was correctly decided121 have 
struggled for decades to rationalize Shelley and the cases that followed.122 
As Mark Rosen describes it, “[s]cholarly explanations of Shelley fall into 
two broad camps. . . . [one which] understands Shelley’s problematic 
analytics as a reflection of the inherent weakness of the distinction between 
public and private action,” and therefore further evidence of the need to 
eliminate that distinction, and another group which has “sought to justify 
Shelley. . . in a way that preserves the public/private distinction.”123 This 
Article is largely unconcerned with the first group, since courts have 
continued to enthusiastically embrace a public/private distinction in 
constitutional law124 and this Article’s goal is explanatory rather than 
normative.125 
 
condominium age limitation, but remanding for a determination of whether the enforcement of the 
limitation was arbitrary). 
 117.  Spencer, 144 N.W.2d at 628–30. 
 118.  Id. at 628–29. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Abbate, 261 N.E.2d at 196–202.  
 121.  Some take the position that it was not correctly decided (or at least should not have been 
decided on constitutional grounds). See, e.g., Saxer, supra note 103, at 119–20. 
 122.  See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 95, at 454.  
 123.  Id. at 470. 
 124.  See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value 
of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1267 (2000) 
(“[C]ourts show no sign of discarding the [state-action] doctrine.”); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of 
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1427 (1982) (“[T]he public/private dichotomy 
[is still] alive and, if anything, growing in influence.”). 
 125.  It would be worth considering, however, what the complete abandonment of the 
public/private distinction would mean in a post-Heller world, since a lot of the scholarship arguing for 
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Scholars arguing for limiting Shelley in a way that preserves the 
public/private distinction have come up with a number of limiting 
principles.126 Thomas Lewis and others have argued that Shelley can be 
understood as a case where the power of zoning—a state function—was 
delegated to private parties through the enforcement of the restrictive 
covenants.127 In other words, Shelley is just an extension of the principle 
announced in Marsh: when private actors step into the government’s shoes, 
constitutional restrictions apply to those actors.128 However, given the 
Court’s reluctance to extend Marsh, discussed in Part I.D, the result in 
Shelley seems more anomalous. Moreover, this theory fails to account for 
courts’ reluctance to expand Shelley to other restrictive covenants where 
private parties have stepped into the role of zoning authorities at least as 
much as the covenant enforcing parties were attempting to do in Shelley.129 
Others have argued that the result in Shelley can be explained by the 
impact the covenant there had on persons who were not parties to the 
original covenant.130 However, while this may be a partial explanation, this 
account also proves too much: nearly all covenants will affect people not 
subject to them; that is the whole point—they run with the land. Also, the 
same thing is true of many private agreements that courts have not 
subjected to constitutional constraints. For example, settlement agreements 
barring a party from speaking about litigation have generally been upheld 
despite their impact on the rights of potential listeners who were not parties 
to those agreements.131 
Another theory is that Shelley is essentially limited to its facts—that it 
only concerns racially restrictive covenants. This theory is—at least 
implicitly—the most widely adopted by courts132 and therefore correct as a 
descriptive matter. However, as Spencer shows, at least where race 
 
the abandonment of that distinction predates Heller.  
 126.  See Rosen, supra note 95, at 474–83. 
 127.  See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 103, at 1115–16; Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past 
Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828, 849–50 (1983).  
 128.  See Lewis, supra note 103, at 1115–16. 
 129.  If anything, the cases discussed above involving “residential property” restrictions are much 
more analogous to zoning regulations than the covenants in Shelley, since they concern the use of the 
land rather than who is allowed to occupy it. 
 130.  See Genelle I. Belmas & Brian N. Larson, Clicking Away Your Speech Rights: The 
Enforceability of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 37, 68 (2007); Burt Neuborne, Ending 
Lochner Lite, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 194–96 (2015). 
 131.  See Rosen, supra note 95, at 458–59. 
 132.  See, e.g., Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition 
of Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 493 & n.140 (1998) (collecting cases). 
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discrimination is involved, courts have occasionally followed Shelley in 
contexts outside of restrictive covenants. And Abbate demonstrates that 
courts will also apply Shelley where a covenant not involving racial 
discrimination is applied in an overtly discriminatory manner to other 
groups. More fundamentally, this theory really just begs the question—it 
does not offer an explanation of why Shelley has been limited to its facts. 
Finally, some have argued that the Court’s decision in Shelley 
represents the result of balancing different constitutional rights—the 
property rights of the covenant holders and the equal protection rights of 
the prospective purchasers.133 This view makes sense and dovetails well 
with the Court’s concern for property rights in the trespass cases discussed 
above. Its main shortcoming is that it does not offer a complete explanation 
of why courts find the balance tips in favor of equal protection rights in 
Shelley and similar cases but tips in favor of private property rights in most 
other cases. 
Combining the latter two theories provides the best explanatory 
framework for understanding Shelley and its progeny. Courts are generally 
willing to enforce private agreements without subjecting them to equal 
protection scrutiny out of respect for the private property rights that those 
agreements represent. However, when an agreement explicitly requires 
racial discrimination or is enforced against other groups in a discriminatory 
manner, courts will not enforce it. 
The reason for the more hostile attitude towards racial discrimination 
than other kinds of discrimination is that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
specifically concerned with eradicating racial discrimination. Although the 
Equal Protection Clause is written in broad terms and has been interpreted 
to prohibit many kinds of discrimination, as the Shelley Court explicitly 
noted, the prevention of discrimination on the basis of race was the primary 
goal of the framers of the amendment.134 This concern is also reflected in 
 
 133.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 551; Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for A 
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 487–88 (1962). 
 134.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). See e.g., David S. Elkind, State Action: Theories 
for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 661 (1974) 
(“[T]he fourteenth amendment’s foremost purpose was the eradication of certain types of racial 
discrimination, as is well-documented by scholarly investigation and judicial opinion.”); Timothy Zick, 
Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and “Classes of One,” 89 KY. L.J. 69, 71 (2001) 
(“[I]t is widely accepted that the principal aim of the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was to eradicate official antebellum discrimination against blacks . . . .”). See also Weise v. Syracuse 
Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975) (“Class-based discrimination is perhaps the practice most 
fundamentally opposed to the stuff of which our national heritage is composed, and by far the most evil 
form of discrimination has been that based on race. It should hardly be surprising, then, that in race 
discrimination cases courts have been particularly vigilant in requiring the states to avoid support of 
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Equal Protection doctrine, which subjects discrimination on the basis of 
race to strict scrutiny while applying lesser scrutiny to almost all other 
forms of discrimination.135 
Similarly, courts’ willingness to apply the Shelley rationale to stop the 
enforcement of facially neutral restrictive covenants in a discriminatory 
manner—even when the discrimination is not racial—ties in well with the 
Supreme Court’s harsh treatment of the discriminatory application of 
neutral laws in equal protection cases.136 As the Court has noted, “‘Equal 
protection’ . . . emphasizes disparity in treatment . . . between classes of 
individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.”137 While the 
Court has found no equal protection problem with facially neutral laws that 
have a discriminatory impact,138 the Supreme Court and lower courts 
closely scrutinize applications of facially neutral laws that treat similarly 
situated people differently, particularly when the differential treatment 
appears to be based on group traits such as religion or age.139 Thus, it 
makes sense that courts would be reluctant to enforce neutral restrictive 
covenants in a discriminatory manner. 
II.  THE CORE RIGHT THEORY 
All the outcomes described above seem quite disparate at first glance 
and, indeed, they are. However, there are some consistent themes which 
recur again and again when courts are asked to use individual constitutional 
rights to limit private law. Taken together, these themes provide a 
framework for understanding how courts approach these cases. Courts have 
shown the most willingness to place constitutional limitations on private 
law when (1) the application of private law would undermine the core of 
the right at issue, (2) placing constitutional limitations on private law 
would not unduly threaten the constitutional rights of the parties seeking 
 
otherwise private discrimination . . . .”). 
 135.  See WILLIAM J. RICH, 1 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11:3 (3rd ed.), Westlaw 
(database updated Dec. 2016). 
 136.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its 
face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race.”).  
 137.  Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974). See also Zick, supra note 134, at 72 (noting that 
non-discrimination between similarly situated groups “has remained the core principle” animating equal 
protection doctrine). 
 138.  See Washington, 426 U.S. at 239. 
 139.  See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). See also LeClair v. Saunders, 627 
F.2d 606, 609–10 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause whenever a person 
“compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and . . . such selective treatment was 
based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of 
constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person”).  
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the private law remedy, and (3) the parties seeking constitutional protection 
did not consent to the private law limitation on their conduct. While the 
first factor—the level of the threat private law presents to the core of the 
right—is the most critical, the other two factors operate as important 
limiting principles. Although these indicators do not create a bright line 
rule or explicit balancing test, they do provide guideposts that explain the 
courts’ willingness to place constitutional constraints on private law in 
some cases but not others. I will call this framework the Core Right 
Theory. In the subsections that follow I will explain the justification for 
each of the three guideposts of the Core Right Theory and then close this 
section with a rebuttal to a potential critique of this theory and a response 
to one alternative approach that has been proposed. 
A.  THE CORE RIGHT THEORY GUIDEPOSTS 
1.  The Core Right Guidepost 
The idea of courts making distinctions between “more important” 
exercises of rights and less important ones seems quite off-putting because 
of the apparent value judgments inherent in such an exercise.140 But such 
distinctions have long been a major part of constitutional law and are 
evident across doctrines associated with several different constitutional 
rights. For example, Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
searches and seizures are at their height in a person’s home where, subject 
to a few limited exceptions, police may not conduct a search without a 
warrant and a showing of probable cause.141 On the other hand, once a 
person leaves the home, some kinds of searches are allowed with a lower 
standard of suspicion and no warrant.142 Similarly, the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel guarantees a criminal defendant in any case the right to hire 
a lawyer of his or her choice because the ability to hire a lawyer of the 
defendant’s choice is “the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee.”143 
 
 140.  See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 485 (2004) 
(criticizing the criteria the Supreme Court has used for determining which types of class legislation are 
“suspect” under the Equal Protection Clause); Anne Salzman, Comment, On the Offensive: Protecting 
Visual Art with Sexual Content Under the First Amendment and the “Less Valuable Speech” Label, 55 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1215, 1220–21 (1994) (arguing that assigning some speech greater protection than 
other speech “necessarily reflects the adjudicating body’s moral judgment of an expression’s value” and 
thereby undermines the First Amendment’s goals). 
 141.  See, e.g., Shafer v. City of Boulder, 896 F. Supp. 2d 915, 928–29 (D. Nev. 2012) (“Both ‘the 
home and its traditional curtilage [are] given the highest protection against warrantless searches and 
seizures.’”) (quoting United States v. Romero–Bustamente, 337 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 142.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
 143.  See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006). 
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By contrast, the Sixth Amendment only guarantees indigent defendants 
access to appointed counsel in cases where the defendant is sentenced to 
incarceration.144 
This greater concern for violations of the core purpose of individual 
rights is a big factor in explaining when the Constitution does and does not 
place limitations on private law. As the discussion in the preceding section 
demonstrates, courts have been much more willing to impose these 
limitations when the central purpose of a right is threatened than when 
more ancillary exercises of the right are burdened. 
The Sullivan line of cases places strict limitations on defamation and 
related torts because those torts threaten to control speech based on its 
content. Content-based controls on speech have long been subject to strict 
First Amendment scrutiny because “[g]overnment action that stifles speech 
on account of its message . . . contravenes th[e] essential right” at “the heart 
of the First Amendment.”145 Thus, it makes sense that a tort that punishes a 
person for speech on a particular topic—e.g., defamatory speech about the 
plaintiff—would at least be subject to some First Amendment restrictions. 
Likewise, the post-Sullivan line of cases giving greater protection to speech 
about public figures and issues of public importance makes sense in light of 
the Court’s view that speech about these topics is a central concern of the 
First Amendment.146 Courts’ skepticism of speech-restricting injunctions 
that are content-based or which restrict speech on matters of public concern 
also fits well with this theme.147 
By contrast, the Court has moved away from placing any serious 
constitutional limitation on the use of trespass actions to remove speakers 
from private property, even when that property is open to the public. 
Although speech is certainly limited in these cases, courts are not enlisted 
to directly enforce a content-based restriction, as they are in defamation 
cases. While a property owner could choose to use the trespass laws only 
on speakers she disagrees with, the court is not being used to regulate the 
content of speech to the same degree as it is in a defamation action. In 
defamation actions, the court specifically adjudicates whether the content 
of speech is liability-triggering, whereas in trespass actions, the court 
simply adjudicates where the speaker was located in order to determine 
liability. In this sense, trespass actions are much more analogous to “time, 
 
 144.  See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). 
 145.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
 146.  See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). 
 147.  See supra Part I.B. 
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place, and manner” restrictions on free speech, which have received lesser 
scrutiny than content-based restrictions.148 In “time, place, and manner” 
cases, it has long been a requirement that the government show that any 
such restriction leaves open “ample alternative channels of 
communication.”149 In most trespass cases, there are ample alternative 
channels for a speaker to broadcast a message. Thus, the only time the 
Court has sanctioned First Amendment limitations on trespass—in 
Marsh—application of the trespass laws within the unique circumstances of 
a company town would have left the speaker with no alternative avenue to 
get his message to local residents. 
In the context of the Equal Protection Clause and restrictive 
covenants, the same pattern exists. Courts have refused to enforce only 
those covenants that strike at the heart of the Equal Protection Clause—the 
prohibition on racial discrimination and disparate treatment of similarly 
situated groups. Other covenants and similar private agreements have 
largely survived without equal protection scrutiny, even when they draw 
distinctions that would receive at least some scrutiny if the government had 
drawn them directly. 
The determination of what constitutes the central purpose of a right is 
at the center of how courts have constructed the doctrine enforcing those 
rights. Courts have simply imported these judgments about what parts of 
each right are really important into the private law context. The difference 
is that in the private law context, only these core parts of each 
constitutional right are protected. The ancillary applications of each right 
that ordinarily receive at least some protection in other contexts—e.g., 
discrimination on bases other than race; time, place, and manner 
restrictions on speech—receive no protection in the private law arena. 
2.  The Buffer Zone Guidepost 
The desire to protect core constitutional values does not provide a 
complete explanation for courts’ treatment of constitutional rights in 
private law litigation. There are times when constitutional rights do not 
limit private law causes of actions even when the application of private law 
would result in the deprivation of a core constitutional right. The most 
obvious example is in the selective application of trespass laws to 
discriminate based on viewpoint. Although as discussed above, courts have 
less involvement in content regulation there than they do in the defamation 
 
 148.  See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 149.  See id. at 802. 
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context, the result is still the enforcement of a viewpoint-based speech 
restriction. Speech restrictions that discriminate based on viewpoint, even 
ones that are limited to a particular location, are ordinarily viewed very 
skeptically by courts because they are “an egregious form of content 
discrimination.”150 However, ever since its retreat from Logan Valley, the 
Supreme Court has explicitly allowed such viewpoint discrimination on 
private property. 
The reluctance to enforce even the core meaning of constitutional 
provisions in some private law cases can be explained by another factor: 
the constitutional rights of private law plaintiffs. By placing limits on 
private law causes of action, courts risk infringing the rights of private law 
plaintiffs. For example, the courts’ unwillingness to place First Amendment 
limitations on trespass actions is likely motivated at least in part by a desire 
to provide breathing space for the constitutional rights of landowners—
specifically the landowners’ property and free speech rights. 
The right to own property is not specifically guaranteed by the 
Constitution, but the Fifth Amendment does forbid the taking of property 
without just compensation.151 If a court prevents a property owner from 
excluding persons that he wishes to exclude, the court is in essence taking a 
portion of the property owner’s interest in the property.152 Similarly, if 
courts required private property owners to allow certain speakers on their 
property, the property owners might be viewed as endorsing the speakers’ 
messages even if they did not agree with them; such forced endorsements 
of particular messages have long been understood to violate the First 
Amendment.153 This solicitude for protecting other constitutional rights 
may also explain courts’ reluctance to use the Equal Protection Clause to 
invalidate wills and trusts that place religious restrictions on testamentary 
gifts. Refusing to enforce such restrictions could burden the First 
Amendment right to free religious exercise of those making the 
 
 150.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).  
 151.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 152.  See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 n.11 (1979) (“[A]n essential element 
of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.”) (citation omitted). Cf. Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010) (“[T]he Takings 
Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the 
instrument of the taking.”). The Court was clearly mindful of this concern when it limited Logan Valley 
in Lloyd. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (noting that the due process clause and 
takings clause were “also relevant to this case”). 
 153.  See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). See also Rosen, supra note 95, at 
473–74 (“[I]gnoring the distinction between public and private threatens what many consider to be the 
core concern of the First Amendment: the protection against a government-created orthodoxy.”). 
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restrictions.154 
This is not to say that the ability to make religiously restrictive 
testamentary gifts or use trespass laws to keep out disfavored speakers is 
constitutionally protected.155 In fact, the Supreme Court specifically 
rejected the latter idea in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, upholding 
a California court ruling extending the California Constitution’s free speech 
guarantee to prevent the ejection of disfavored speakers from a private 
shopping center.156 However, the desire to leave a buffer zone to avoid 
having to adjudicate conflicts between competing constitutional interests is 
a major factor that influences courts’ willingness to apply constitutional 
rights to private law disputes.157 
3.  The Contract Guidepost 
Another important limitation on constitutional rights in private law 
disputes is most prominent in a particular kind of private law—contracts. 
As described above, courts have been particularly reluctant to apply 
constitutional limitations to agreements freely entered into by private 
parties. Through contracts, parties may limit their speech, including by 
subject matter, with no constitutional problem. As also discussed above, 
this is likely rooted in the waivable nature of First Amendment rights.158 It 
is also a reflection of the special role that the freedom to contract plays in 
American society.159 
Shelley arguably runs counter to this principle; restrictive covenants 
are essentially a species of contract and yet received no similar solicitude in 
that case. However, there are at least two key differences between ordinary 
contracts and restrictive covenants. First, restrictive covenants run with the 
land, and therefore bind parties who may not have been involved in the 
 
 154.  See In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d 520, 526 (Pa. 1975) (noting that through a testamentary 
condition requiring church membership, “the testatrix sought by this bequest to further her own free-
exercise interest in seeking adherents to her faith”). Cf. David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 61, 89 (2012) (arguing “that testation is communicative” and thus “some restrictions on 
testamentary freedom [should] trigger First Amendment scrutiny.”).  
 155.  See In re Laning, 339 A.2d at 526 (“[W]e need not say that the testatrix had a constitutional 
right to have the condition enforced, for a state may accommodate a free exercise interest which does 
not amount to a constitutional right.”). 
 156.  Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980). 
 157.  See Elkind, supra note 134, at 662. 
 158.  See, e.g., Charter Commc’ns, Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz, 304 F.3d 927, 935 n.9 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 159.  See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 
504 n.451 (1993) (noting “the special place that contract enforcement occupies in the Court’s hierarchy 
of common law principles, a position that helps explain the result in Cohen”). 
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initial bargain that led to their creation.160 Second, the enforcement of 
racially restrictive covenants has effects on people who are not parties to 
those agreements or even current owners of land subject to the covenants, 
because they prevent prospective buyers of particular races from 
purchasing those properties.161 Thus, while the consensual nature of 
restrictive covenants may provide a further reason why courts usually do 
not subject them to constitutional scrutiny, the aspects of restrictive 
covenants that are nonconsensual explain why courts have made some 
exceptions. 
B.  LIMITATIONS, POTENTIAL CRITIQUES, AND AN ALTERNATIVE 
Although these guideposts are far from precise, the Core Right Theory 
offers the best explanatory model for understanding the courts’ treatment of 
constitutional challenges to private law. However, it is important to 
understand the limitations of the claim I am making. Most importantly, this 
framework is intended to be explanatory, not normative. There may be 
many powerful normative critiques of the Core Right Theory, including 
that it affords courts too much discretion, it overly relies on the 
private/public distinction, or that it privileges contractual and private 
property rights over equal protection and speech rights without 
justification. An assessment of those critiques is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Instead, my claim is simply that this is the approach courts have 
taken and that it represents the best starting point in thinking about how 
courts might assess similar claims in the context of the Second 
Amendment. 
Perhaps the most obvious explanatory critique of the Core Right 
Theory is that it ignores the role that notions of state action play in these 
decisions. Some scholars have argued that the courts’ application of the 
Constitution to private law cases is driven by an assessment of how much 
the private party attempting to enforce a private law right is taking on a 
government-like role.162 The strongest example of this kind of analysis in 
these cases is in Marsh where the Court noted the government-like role that 
the private entity played in running the company town. Although the Court 
did not make the point explicit, scholars have also pointed to Shelley as an 
 
 160.  Indeed, that was exactly the case in Shelley. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 5 (1948) 
(“The trial court found that petitioners had no actual knowledge of the restrictive agreement at the time 
of the purchase.”).  
 161.  See Belmas & Larson, supra note 130, at 68 (“The Court suggested that this case affects 
outside parties; it is not merely the state enforcing a contract voluntarily entered into by private 
parties.”). 
 162.  See, e.g., sourced cited supra note 127.  
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example of this phenomenon, since restrictive covenants operate much the 
same way as municipal zoning laws do in controlling certain uses of 
property.163 
However, the question of whether a particular actor is actually an arm 
of the government or acting in close concert with the government is 
analytically distinct from the question of how constitutional rights apply to 
private law. If a private party is actually not private, but a governmental 
actor, then its actions must be subjected to constitutional scrutiny whether 
or not they involve the use of private law. For example, if a publicly funded 
school is a state actor, it will be unconstitutional for it to remove disfavored 
speakers from its public forums whether or not that removal is 
accomplished through trespass suits or through the enforcement of the 
policy by school officials. Therefore, while a question about whether a 
party is a state actor may be raised in a private law case, that question is 
analytically distinct from the more general question about whether 
particular private law causes of action must be subject to constitutional 
restrictions. 
While understanding and critiquing the courts’ approach to “state 
action” is a worthwhile endeavor, such theories have little to tell us about 
how courts approach the problem of constitutional rights and private law. 
After all, in cases that clearly do not involve a private party exercising 
public functions, a state action theory should yield the same results 
regardless of which constitutional right is at issue and which kind of private 
law is involved because the level of state involvement is always the same: 
the court is enforcing the common-law right of one private individual 
against another. A court adjudicating a trespass claim that suppresses 
speech is (or is not) a state actor just as much as one adjudicating a libel 
claim that suppresses speech, yet the latter is subject to severe 
constitutional restrictions while the former is not. Thus, courts are not 
making judgments in these cases about state action at all. Rather, they are 
making a judgment that is tied to the constitutional right asserted in each 
case and its relationship to the particular private law dispute at issue. 
In the only other article so far to directly address the issue of the 
Second Amendment’s application to private law, Joseph Blocher and 
Darrell A.H. Miller make an alternative proposal.164 Their article—which 
concerns the broader universe of “generally applicable laws” imposing 
 
 163.  See id. 
 164.  See Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental 
Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 296–303 (2016). 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT & PRIVATE LAW [JACOBS SSRN].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/2017  1:18 PM 
976 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:945 
incidental burdens on the use of guns, including but not limited to private 
law—disclaims any attempt “to synthesize . . . a transsubstantive approach 
for evaluating the constitutional salience of incidental burdens” on 
constitutional rights.165 Instead, Blocher and Miller draw on constitutional 
doctrine in other areas to outline four “main forms of argument” that are 
relevant to the question of whether incidental burdens on gun rights are 
subject to Second Amendment scrutiny: history and tradition, the degree of 
the burden imposed, the impact on the court system and on private rights of 
imposing constitutional scrutiny on the incidental burden at issue, and the 
purpose and design of the incidental burden.166 As they explain in their 
article, each of these four modalities has some basis in the treatment of 
incidental burdens in other areas of constitutional doctrine.167 
While these four modalities may be helpful in understanding the way 
courts treat incidental burdens generally, they are less helpful in the 
specific context of private law. As an initial matter, Blocher and Miller 
improperly categorize all private law burdens on constitutional rights as 
incidental, when that is not always true. Private law burdens on 
constitutional rights can be incidental, such as the burden neutral contract 
law imposes on speech when it is used to enforce a contract limiting a 
party’s speech. But private law burdens can also be direct. For example, 
defamation torts directly assign liability based on the content of the 
defendant’s speech. Blocher and Miller do not make this distinction, and in 
failing to do so they miss the courts’ unique treatment of private law as a 
distinct category of constitutional burdens (whether direct or indirect).168  
I agree with Blocher and Miller that the degree of the burden on the 
right at issue and the potential for interference with private rights are 
factors that are relevant to courts in determining whether constitutional 
scrutiny is appropriate in private law cases.169 However, their first and 
fourth proposed modalities—history and tradition and the purpose of the 
regulation, respectively—in my view are merely aspects of the core right 
 
 165.  Id. at 331. 
 166.  Id. at 331–33. 
 167.  See id. at 331–347. 
 168.  See id. at 343 (discussing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan as an example of how the court 
treats civil suits between private parties in discussing the third modality). 
 169.  Although in my view the relevant consideration is whether other private constitutional rights 
are implicated, whereas Blocher and Miller argue for a more general consideration of the impact of the 
proposed constitutional limitation on “the division between public and private regulation” which 
“preserve[s] a private sphere in which individuals can govern themselves.” See id. at 342. For the 
reasons described supra in section II.B, I think specific constitutional rights are of more concern to 
courts than general structural considerations, though structural considerations may be part of the reason 
constitutional scrutiny is limited to private law burdens on core constitutional values.  
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question. These factors are only relevant insomuch as they play a role in 
determining the core of the constitutional right at issue. For example, 
history and tradition played little role in the court’s decision in Sullivan, 
which completely upended centuries of common law. Similarly, although 
the purpose of the regulation does play a role in many of these cases, it 
only does so because purposeful discrimination and purposeful suppression 
of speech are always subject to extra scrutiny, whether courts are dealing 
with public or private law. The importance the distinction between 
purposeful and non-purposeful constitutional violations takes on in these 
cases is simply another example of courts’ willingness to protect only the 
core of constitutional rights in private law cases. 
III.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S CORE 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, which for the first time 
recognized that the Second Amendment contained an individual right to 
own firearms, was a doctrinal earthquake that essentially created a new 
area of constitutional law overnight. It evoked plenty of criticism170 and 
praise,171 both for its reasoning and its result, but for courts and scholars it 
also gave rise to a plethora of questions about the scope of this newly 
recognized right. Where does an individual have a right to use a firearm? 
What kind of firearms are protected by the Second Amendment? Who can 
be excluded from firearm ownership?172 The intensity of the debate about 
these questions is not just a product of the controversial subject matter of 
gun control, but also of the lack of clarity about the scope of the Second 
Amendment right provided by Heller and the Court’s unwillingness to 
meaningfully revisit the Second Amendment subsequently. However, even 
with all these important lingering questions, one thing that Heller and 
lower courts’ subsequent efforts to apply it have made clear is that the core 
of the Second Amendment right is the right of (most) individuals to keep 
firearms in their homes for self-defense. 
In Heller, the Court struck down the District of Columbia’s ban on 
handguns and its requirement that other guns be disassembled and locked 
 
 170.  See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626 (2008); Paul Finkelman, It Really Was About A Well 
Regulated Militia, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 267, 267–69 (2008).  
 171.  See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Second Amendment: Not Constitutional Dysfunction but 
Necessary Safeguard, 94 B.U. L. REV. 835, 830–40 (2014); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Supreme Court 
and the Uses of History: District of Columbia v. Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2009). 
 172.  See generally Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009) (outlining 
Second Amendment doctrinal questions raised by Heller). 
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away when not in use.173 As the Court framed it, the case presented the 
question of whether the Second Amendment174 protected “only the right to 
possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service” or “an 
individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, 
and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense 
within the home.”175 In choosing the latter interpretation, the Court argued 
at length that the Second Amendment was understood at the time it was 
ratified as conferring an individual right to keep and bear arms unconnected 
with militia service.176 The Court held that the right to keep and bear arms 
was a preexisting natural right that the Second Amendment merely 
codified.177 The Court described this right as an “individual right to possess 
and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”178 
The Court did not go into great detail about the content of this newly 
recognized right, but did note that the right to use firearms for self-defense 
was the “central component” of the Second Amendment right.179 The Court 
also clarified that this self-defense-oriented right was most important in the 
home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute.”180 The Court also noted that the Second Amendment did not confer 
a right “to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”181 Accordingly, the Court cautioned 
that nothing in its “opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or 
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools 
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms,” which the Court described as 
“presumptively lawful.”182 
Since Heller, the Supreme Court has only decided one significant 
 
 173.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 174.  The Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
II. 
 175.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 577. 
 176.  See id. at 576–619. 
 177.  See id. at 592. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See id. at 599, 628. See also id. at 630 (referring to self-defense as the “core lawful purpose” 
of the Second Amendment’s protection of firearm ownership). 
 180.  Id. at 628. See also id. at 635 (“[The Second Amendment] surely elevates above all other 
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”). 
 181.  Id. at 626. 
 182.  Id. at 626–27 & n.26. 
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Second Amendment case: McDonald v. City of Chicago.183 In McDonald, 
the Court held that the Second Amendment was applicable to state and 
local governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.184 In describing the right, the Court reiterated Heller’s conclusion 
“that individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second 
Amendment right” and that “‘the need for defense of self, family, and 
property is most acute’ in the home . . . .”185 Aside from McDonald, 
though, the Supreme Court has said almost nothing about how Second 
Amendment claims should be analyzed in the near-decade since Heller.186 
Despite the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts 
have developed a relatively uniform way of looking at Second Amendment 
cases that confirms the core purpose of the Second Amendment as the 
preservation of a right to armed self-defense in the home. Most federal 
courts of appeal have adopted a two-part test that first asks whether the law 
at issue burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.187 If the law 
is found to burden such conduct, courts will then apply an “appropriate” 
level of scrutiny to the law, depending upon the severity of the burden on 
Second Amendment rights.188 In the first step of this analysis, courts 
usually look to history to determine if the conduct at issue was within the 
scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the time of 
ratification.189 At the second step, courts decide on an appropriate level of 
scrutiny based on “(1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second 
Amendment right and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”190 
When employing this approach, courts have consistently defined the “core” 
of the Second Amendment as “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens 
 
 183.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 742 (2010). 
 184.  Id. at 791 (plurality opinion). Only four Justices believed that the Due Process Clause 
incorporated the Second Amendment. Id. Justice Thomas also believed that the Second Amendment 
was incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, but through its Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, not the Due Process Clause. Id. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 185.  Id. at 767, 787 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 628). 
 186.  In Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027 (2016), in a very brief opinion, the 
Court summarily revived a challenge to Massachusetts’s ban on certain stun guns. Id. at 1027–28. The 
Court noted that in Heller it had rejected the assertion that the Second Amendment only protects 
weapons in existence at the time of the founding—an argument the lower court had erroneously adopted 
in Caetano—but provided no further guidance on how to analyze such claims. Id.  
 187.  See Cody J. Jacobs, End the Popularity Contest: A Proposal for Second Amendment “Type 
of Weapon” Analysis, 83 TENN. L. REV. 231, 248 & n.74 (2015) (collecting cases applying this 
approach). 
 188.  See id. 
 189.  See id. at 249. 
 190.  E.g., Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015). 
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to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”191 
The extra scrutiny given to laws burdening the right of “law-abiding” 
citizens to employ armed self-defense in the home is evident in how 
different kinds of firearm restrictions have fared since Heller was decided. 
For example, courts have looked very skeptically at laws forbidding or 
severely restricting the commercial sale of firearms and thus keeping 
people from owning guns in their homes.192 Similarly, in Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, the Seventh Circuit found that a Chicago ordinance banning the 
operation of firing ranges warranted heightened “if not quite strict” scrutiny 
because, when combined with another ordinance requiring gun owners to 
have firing range training, it was a significant burden on “the core right to 
possess firearms for self-defense.”193 By contrast, even relatively strict 
restrictions on carrying firearms outside the home have been upheld as long 
as they fall short of a complete ban on the practice.194 Likewise, laws 
restricting the ownership of firearms by people who are not law-abiding or 
for purposes other than self-defense have almost uniformly been upheld.195 
Thus, despite the continuing uncertainty about the full scope of the Second 
Amendment’s coverage, Heller and the lower courts applying it are fairly 
clear on what the core right is that the Second Amendment protects. 
Despite this doctrinal consensus, Blocher and Miller argue that there is 
no “clear theory of the Second Amendment’s values,” and without such a 
theory, there is no way to determine how burdensome any given law is to 
the Second Amendment right.196 Although they concede that Heller and 
McDonald establish the central component of the Second Amendment right 
 
 191.  See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 180 (4th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 
2017) (en banc); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 192.  See Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, 854 
F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding a zoning ordinance that made it very difficult to open new gun stores 
burdened conduct “close” to the core of the Second Amendment and therefore warranted heightened 
scrutiny); Illinois Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 947 (N.D. Ill. 
2014) (striking down a total ban on gun sales in the City of Chicago). 
 193.  Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 194.  See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding law 
requiring “good cause” for the issuance of a permit to carry a concealed weapon); Drake v. Filko, 724 
F.3d 426, 434–35 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(same); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (same). 
 195.  See, e.g., Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 346 
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (finding “no legal support for Plaintiffs’ argument that Second Amendment protections 
extend to recreational hunting”); Jacobs, supra note 187, at 251 n.83 (collecting cases upholding the 
federal prohibition on domestic violence misdemeanants possessing firearms). See also Joseph Blocher, 
Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 137 (2015) (“[T]he case for Second 
Amendment coverage of hunting and recreation is tenuous.”). 
 196.  Blocher & Miller, supra note 164, at 341, 347–48. 
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as self-defense, they argue that a larger theory is necessary to understand 
the purpose or value of having such a self-defense right.197 Accordingly, 
they propose three theoretical approaches to the Second Amendment that 
are purportedly consistent with a self-defense oriented right: (1) an 
approach based on personal autonomy that is primarily concerned with “the 
liberty of self-reliance rather than instrumental ends like preventing tyranny 
or even promoting personal safety,” (2) an approach based on the idea that 
the Second Amendment preserves a right to self-defense against the 
government—that is, it acts as a bulwark against tyranny, and (3) an 
approach based on personal safety—the idea that the government should 
not be able to decide who can use violence to protect themselves.198 
While these theories are all intriguing as potential competing 
justifications for the desirability of gun ownership, only the third is 
consistent with Heller. The autonomy approach explicitly disclaims the 
importance of personal safety, which of course is at the heart of Heller’s 
description of the right protected. As described above, Heller declared that 
the Second Amendment protects a right to armed confrontation for self-
defense, and explicitly rejected the idea that the Second Amendment 
protects a right to bear arms for any purpose whatsoever. Moreover, an 
autonomy theory of the Second Amendment is not consistent with the 
emphasis Heller and subsequent lower court opinions place on the use of 
firearms in the home.199 The need for personal autonomy is the same 
outside the home as it is inside of it.200 Thus, as Blocher and Miller 
ultimately concede themselves, this theory is not very consistent with a 
“constitutional right predicated on self-defense.”201 
Blocher and Miller’s second theory fares no better in this regard. 
Although Heller acknowledged that the prefatory clause of the Second 
Amendment announced a purpose to maintain state militias in order to 
protect against a tyrannical federal government, it also emphasized that this 
was merely the purpose for codifying a pre-existing right whose central 
component was personal self-defense, not defense against a tyrannical 
 
 197.  Id. at 347–48. 
 198.  Id. at 348–54. 
 199.  Indeed, Miller himself has argued that “[t]he home is a fault line that runs deep within the 
text, context, and history of the Second Amendment . . . .” See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns As Smut: 
Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1310–11 (2009). 
 200.  Blocher and Miller critique this theory as overly expansive at least in part for this reason. 
See Blocher & Miller, supra note 164, at 349–50 (noting that an autonomy theory might suggest Second 
Amendment scrutiny is applicable to a store owner’s desire to exclude a gun carrier from his store).  
 201.  Id. at 350. 
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government.202 This is confirmed further by McDonald, which noted that 
by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, “the fear that the 
National Government would disarm the universal militia . . . had largely 
faded as a popular concern, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly 
valued for purposes of self-defense.”203 Moreover, such a conception of the 
right would be inconsistent with Heller’s express exclusion of weapons 
“most useful in military service” from the Second Amendment’s 
coverage204 and with lower courts’ repeated rejection of challenges to bans 
on assault weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines.205 
The only one of Blocher and Miller’s proposed theories that is 
consistent with the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller and 
expounded upon by the lower courts since then is the one premised on 
personal safety. This theory accounts for the Second Amendment’s central 
concern with self-defense, the exceptions to the right that Heller 
recognized, and the interest-balancing “level of scrutiny” analysis that 
lower courts have applied. In essence, Heller’s conception of the Second 
Amendment embraces the theory that a populace with the choice to arm 
themselves is safer than one where the government is solely responsible for 
choosing who is armed. The balance can be tipped in the other direction, 
however, where the cost of allowing firearm use or ownership becomes 
higher than the gains to public safety. For example, while under this view a 
typical law-abiding citizen with a gun generates more safety, a convicted 
felon with a gun does not. 
Therefore I think, contrary to Blocher and Miller, that the courts have 
already made a choice between the competing theoretical justifications for 
 
 202.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595–600 (2008). See also Hollis v. Lynch, 
827 F.3d 436, 447 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[S]elf-defense, not revolution, ‘is the central component of the 
Second Amendment.’”) (citation omitted). The Court also noted “modern developments have limited 
the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right” since “it may be true that no 
amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–
28. 
 203.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 770 (2010). See also Glenn H. Reynolds & 
Brannon P. Denning, How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Second Amendment: A Reply to 
Professor Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV. 89, 98 (2013) (“[T]he right to keep and bear arms underwent a 
reinterpretation in light of the Civil War and Reconstruction. . . . Reconstruction gun-toting was 
individualistic, accentuating not group rights of the citizenry but self-regarding privileges of discrete 
citizens to individual self-protection.”). 
 204.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
 205.  See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied sub nom. Shew v. Malloy, 136 S. Ct. 2486, 2486 (2016); Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 
991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2015); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 
2011).  
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an individual Second Amendment right.206 I agree with Blocher and Miller, 
however, that this theoretical understanding can help provide a basis for a 
better understanding of how courts might approach the questions about the 
Second Amendment and private law which I will discuss in the next 
section. 
IV.  THE CORE RIGHT THEORY APPLIED TO THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 
Issues related to private law and the Second Amendment have rarely 
been litigated and have produced virtually no published opinions since 
Heller.207 However, it is not hard to imagine a few areas of private law 
where the Second Amendment could have a significant impact. Although 
this is not an exhaustive list, below I will discuss five areas where the 
Second Amendment is likely to intersect with private law: self-defense, 
products liability, nuisance, negligent entrustment, and property rights. For 
each area, I will discuss how the Second Amendment and private law might 
come into conflict and how the Core Right Theory suggests courts might 
analyze these issues. 
A.  SELF-DEFENSE 
One area where the Second Amendment may be raised as an issue in 
private law litigation is in cases involving self-defense itself. As described 
above, the concept of self-defense is at the core of the Second Amendment 
right recognized in Heller, and a few scholars have already suggested that 
Heller necessarily implies an independent constitutional right to self-
defense.208 In civil cases, self-defense is understood as a person’s privilege 
to use reasonable force to defend herself when she “reasonably believes” 
she is threatened with “bodily harm, offensive bodily contact, or 
 
 206.  This is not to say that the personal safety theory is normatively correct or more coherent than 
the other theories Blocher and Miller offer. Rather, I simply claim that it is the only one of the three 
theories that is consistent with the Second Amendment right as it is currently understood by the courts. 
 207.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1248 
(11th Cir. 2012) is a notable exception which is discussed infra in Part IV.E. 
 208.  See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal 
Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
1205, 1231 (2009); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary 
Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 257 (2012). Of course, many have argued that the Constitution 
contains a right to self-defense independent of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Jason T. Anderson, 
Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 585 (2009); Anders Kaye, Comment, Dangerous Places: 
The Right to Self-Defense in Prison and Prison Conditions Jurisprudence, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 709 
(1996). 
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confinement,” even if the use of such “reasonable force would otherwise 
amount to a tort such as a battery or assault . . . .”209 When deadly force is 
involved, some states require a person to retreat if an opportunity to do so 
is available instead of using deadly force unless that person is being 
attacked in his or her home.210 Heller raises two questions about the use of 
the self-defense defense in civil cases: (1) must the definition of 
“reasonable force” always, or at least more often, include the use of arms; 
and (2) is a duty to retreat consistent with Heller?211 
What is defined as reasonable force in any particular case is a highly 
fact-bound inquiry that turns on what a reasonable person under the 
circumstances “would regard as permissible in view of the danger 
threatening” her.212 Usually, the determination of whether force was 
reasonable in a particular case is a question of fact for the jury.213 The 
addition of the malice requirement in Sullivan was at least partially 
motivated by concerns that juries were more likely to find negligence in 
defamation cases where the underlying speech was controversial.214 A 
defendant claiming self-defense might argue that juries in some places will 
be similarly skeptical about the use of firearms as a means of self-defense 
and that some Sullivan-like alteration of the common law is necessary to 
preserve Second Amendment rights. 
The Core Right Theory, however, shows that this argument is not 
likely to hold much water. While self-defense is certainly at the core of the 
Second Amendment, the reasonableness requirement is simply part of the 
definition of what self-defense is rather than a limitation on self-defense. 
The use of force which is not reasonable is, by definition, not self-defense, 
but rather an offensive use of force that Heller would not sanction.215 Self-
 
 209.  DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 7.1 (2d 
ed. 2000).  
 210.  See Jason W. Bobo, Comment, Following the Trend: Alabama Abandons the Duty to Retreat 
and Encourages Citizens to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 346–47, 351–52 (2008). 
 211.  There are also some interesting questions outside the private law context about how a 
constitutional right to self-defense might apply in places such as schools or prisons, where the state 
might restrict or eliminate self-defense as a defense to disciplinary action. See Brett N. v. Cmty. Unit 
Sch. Dist. No. 303, No. 08 C 3092, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12444 (N.D. III. Feb. 18, 2009) (finding no 
such right in the school context).  
 212.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
 213.  See, e.g., Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 77 (Cal. 1998).  
 214.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
flexibility which inheres in the reasonable-care standard will create the danger that a jury will convert it 
into ‘an instrument for the suppression of those “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks,” . . . which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to 
prevail.’”) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971)). 
 215.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“[W]e do not read the Second 
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defense has always had a proportionality requirement, including at the 
founding and earlier.216 Moreover, the buffer zone guidepost comes into 
play here since sanctioning purportedly defensive violence that lacks 
proportionality threatens the bodily integrity rights of others.217 Although 
there may be no constitutional right to be protected from attacks by private 
parties,218 the buffer zone guidepost serves to ensure that constitutional 
encroachments on private law leave open ample space for the exercise of 
other rights, even when the content of that space is not independently 
constitutionally protected. As discussed above, courts refused to employ 
the First Amendment to substantially limit trespass actions in order to 
provide breathing space for the exercise of property rights, despite the lack 
of a freestanding constitutional right to use trespass actions to keep out 
protesters.219 Similarly, refusing to employ the Second Amendment to limit 
the self-defense proportionality requirement would provide breathing space 
for the exercise of bodily integrity rightsm even though there is no 
freestanding right to be free from private violence. Thus, it seems unlikely 
that Heller will ultimately be read to require any change to the self-defense 
proportionality requirement. 
Heller may figure more prominently in cases dealing with the duty to 
retreat. The duty to retreat requires a person who is being physically 
attacked to retreat instead of using deadly force against an attacker if an 
opportunity to retreat is available.220 An exception to this requirement, 
called the castle doctrine, allows the use of deadly defensive force without 
a duty to retreat when a person is attacked inside his or her home.221 A 
defendant asserting a self-defense claim may argue that the duty to retreat 
is inconsistent with a Second Amendment right based on a “right of self-
preservation . . . permitting a citizen to repel force by force when the 
intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an 
injury.”222 
 
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation . . . .”). 
 216.  See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide Popular Revolt Against Proportionality in Self-
Defense Law, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 331, 332 & n.1 (2006). 
 217.  See, e.g., Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The right to be free of 
state-occasioned damage to a person’s bodily integrity is protected by the fourteenth amendment 
guarantee of due process.”), abrogated on other grounds by Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1447 
(5th Cir. 1993).  
 218.  See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). 
 219.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 220.  See Bobo, supra note 210, at 351–52. 
 221.  See id. 
 222.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). See Madison Fair, Note, Dare 
Defend: Standing for Stand Your Ground, 38 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 155–59 (2014) (arguing that the 
duty to retreat is inconsistent with the Second Amendment). See also Joshua Prince & Allen Thompson, 
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Unlike the proportionality requirement, the duty to retreat is not 
inherent in the concept of self-defense itself and lacks the proportionality 
requirement’s clear historical pedigree.223 But does the duty to retreat really 
burden the core right to armed self-defense in the home? Not to a 
significant degree. The duty to retreat places some limitations on where a 
person can defend themselves with deadly force—they can only do so 
either (1) in the home, or (2) outside the home in places where there is no 
opportunity to retreat. But limiting (and by no means eliminating) self-
defense outside the home while leaving it unburdened inside the home 
tracks nicely with the core right protected by Heller. Since the need for 
self-defense is “most acute” in the home224 and the duty to retreat does not 
apply there, that duty does not burden the core Second Amendment 
right.225 
Still, there are situations when the duty to retreat could require Second 
Amendment scrutiny. In particular, although every state recognizes some 
version of the castle doctrine,226 some states still require a person to retreat 
when she is attacked in her own home if the aggressor is also a resident of 
the same home.227 Unlike the general duty to retreat, a duty to retreat while 
in the home, even if the attacker is also at home, strikes at the core of the 
Second Amendment right to armed self-defense in the home. Heller’s 
description of the importance of using firearms “in defense of hearth and 
home”228 is in tension with the idea of requiring a person to retreat from her 
own home simply because she happens to share a home with the person 
who is attacking her. The buffer zone concern is not applicable here since a 
 
The Inalienable Right to Stand Your Ground, 27 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 32, 36–46 (2015) (arguing that 
the duty to retreat is inconsistent with the “natural right” of self-defense). 
 223.  See Pamela Cole Bell, Stand Your Ground Laws: Mischaracterized, Misconstrued, and 
Misunderstood, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 383, 388 (2015) (“The majority of the new states did not adopt the 
English duty to retreat before using deadly force to defend against deadly force and instead allowed 
those confronted with deadly force to stand their ground and not retreat.”). 
 224.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 225.  This is not to say that the Second Amendment has no application outside the home. Most 
courts that have examined the issue have either concluded that it does or assumed as much. See Drake 
v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 445 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). As discussed 
above, the relevant question in analyzing the intersection of constitutional rights and private law is 
whether the core of the constitutional right is implicated, not whether the application of private law 
burdens any aspect of a constitutional right. 
 226.  See, e.g., Lydia Zbrzeznj, Note, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting 
Citizens to Arm Themselves and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 FLA. 
COASTAL L. REV. 231, 274 (2012). 
 227.  See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 n.8 (Fla. 1999). See also Catherine L. Carpenter, 
Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 658–59 (2003) 
(“[D]ivergent opinions have emerged on the Castle Doctrine’s applicability to cohabitants”). 
 228.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
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person has no constitutional right to physically attack someone even in his 
own home; nor does he have a constitutional right to be free from violent 
self-defensive measures taken by the victim (assuming those measures 
meet the proportionality—and other—requirements for self-defense). Thus, 
Heller likely requires that some Second Amendment scrutiny be applied to 
laws placing a duty to retreat on persons who are attacked in their own 
home by a cohabitant.229 
  B.  PRODUCTS LIABILITY  
Advocates for reducing gun violence have often proposed bringing 
products liability lawsuits against gun manufacturers.230 One theory for 
such lawsuits is that gun manufacturers should have integrated certain 
features into their guns to make them safer, such as chamber load 
indicators,231 trigger locks, or “smart gun” technologies that prevent use by 
people other than the owner.232 Another theory is that weapons with 
particular characteristics—such as assault weapons233—are so dangerous 
that it is negligent to market them at all.234 The ability to bring suits under 
these kinds of theories has been severely limited by the federal Protection 
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which immunizes gun 
manufacturers from suits relating to the “criminal or unlawful misuse” of 
their products.235 However, that law is quite controversial, and bills have 
frequently been introduced to repeal it.236 Moreover, the PLCAA is subject 
to a few narrow but important exceptions that may still allow some 
litigation based on these kinds of theories.237 
 
 229.  The Core Right Theory does not necessarily predict how such requirements would fare 
under Second Amendment scrutiny, only that they would likely receive such scrutiny. 
 230.  See, e.g., Patrick Luff, Regulating Firearms Through Litigation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 
1583 (2014). Such suits have been attempted before. See RICHARD C. MILLER, 4 LITIGATING TORT 
CASES § 51:40, Westlaw (database updated June 2017) (describing one such case involving a lawsuit 
against a major handgun manufacturer for design defect and failure to warn).  
 231.  A chamber load indicator is a device on a gun that provides a clear indication when a round 
is in the firing chamber. Jacobs, supra note 187, at 268–69. 
 232.  See 84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 109 §§ 2–5, Westlaw (database updated August 2017); Luff, supra 
note 230, at 1595;  
 233.  For a discussion of the controversy surrounding this phrase, see Jacobs, supra note 187, at 
235–36 nn.9, 19.  
 234.  See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 119 (Cal. 2001) (rejecting a lawsuit against a gun 
manufacturer brought under this kind of theory because of a statutory bar on products liability lawsuits 
against gun manufacturers). 
 235.  15 U.S.C. §§ 7902, 7903(5)(a) (2012). 
 236.  See, e.g., Equal Access to Justice for Victims of Gun Violence Act, H.R. 4399, 114th Cong 
(2016). 
 237.  For example, the PLCAA has an exception for negligent entrustment actions, as well as for 
actions that occur when a defendant violates a state law applicable to firearm manufacturers. See 15 
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If and when such litigation is able to move forward, a question that 
will likely arise is whether the Second Amendment provides any kind of 
defense for manufacturers being sued under such theories.238 Heller said 
little about the types of guns that were protected by the Second 
Amendment, except that it protects arms that are in “common use” and that 
“handguns” qualified as such.239 The Court also noted that one of the 
limitations of the Second Amendment right was that it did not extend to 
“dangerous and unusual” weapons.240 Lower courts have largely 
interpreted this test to mean that weapons that are commonly owned—
those that are owned by large raw numbers of people—are protected.241 A 
gun manufacturer in a products liability case who is being sued on a theory 
either that a gun is simply too dangerous to market to the public or that a 
gun should have incorporated a better alternative design (i.e., certain safety 
features) could argue that it cannot be held liable for marketing a gun that 
is commonly owned and, thus, protected by the Second Amendment. 
A threshold question under either theory is whether the Second 
Amendment guarantees some right to manufacture and sell firearms. 
Although few courts have dealt with the issue, those that have analyzed it 
have almost all concluded that the Second Amendment does guarantee 
some right to sell firearms.242 While no court so far has examined the 
manufacturing issue, Josh Blackman has made a compelling argument that 
a corresponding manufacturing right exists.243 These conclusions make 
sense. Without a right to sell or manufacture firearms, the government 
 
U.S.C. § 7903(5)(ii)–(iii). Some victims of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting have used 
these exceptions to craft a lawsuit against the manufacturer of the gun involved in that shooting, based 
on a theory that marketing such a lethal assault rifle to the general public constituted negligent 
entrustment and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. See Soto v. Bushmaster 
Firearms Int’l, LLC, No. FBTCV156048103S, 2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1270, at *1–2 (Super. Ct. 
Apr. 14, 2016). 
 238.  See Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1317 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting an argument 
that the Second Amendment provided a defense to an action against gun manufacturers for negligent 
marketing of handguns based on a militia-centric understanding of the Second Amendment). 
 239.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581–82, 624, 628–29 (2008).  
 240.  Id. at 627 (citations omitted). 
 241.  Jacobs, supra note 187, at 263–64. As I have argued elsewhere, this test raises many 
questions and seems somewhat at odds with a self-defense based right. Id. at 263–78. 
 242.  See Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, 854 
F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 n.8 (3rd Cir. 2010); Illinois 
Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2014). But see  
United States v. Chafin, 423 F. App’x 342, 344 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Chafin has not pointed this court to 
any authority, and we have found none, that remotely suggests that, at the time of its ratification, the 
Second Amendment was understood to protect an individual’s right to sell a firearm.”).  
 243.  Josh Blackman, The 1st Amendment, 2nd Amendment, and 3D Printed Guns, 81 TENN. L. 
REV. 479, 496 (2014). 
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could get around the Second Amendment entirely by banning the sale or 
production of guns. For the same reason, the right to sell and manufacture 
firearms must be part of the core of the Second Amendment right, since it 
would be impossible for citizens to keep arms for self-defense in the home 
without the ability to purchase firearms. However, the Court specifically 
noted in Heller that “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms” were presumptively lawful.244 Thus, while the 
core of the Second Amendment right does include the right to sell and 
manufacture firearms, the state has at least some ability to regulate that 
aspect of the right. 
How the Core Right Theory would apply to a products liability suit 
depends upon the theory of liability that is being pursued against a gun 
manufacturer. On the theory that a particular gun is simply too dangerous 
on the whole to market to the general public (i.e., that its risk outweighs its 
utility), whether the right to that particular gun is at the core of the Second 
Amendment right would probably depend on whether the gun at issue is 
commonly owned.245 If it is, then a gun manufacturer would be able to 
claim that some form of Second Amendment scrutiny should apply. Of 
course, the fact that the Second Amendment would apply to such a suit 
does not necessarily mean that the suit would fail. Rather, the plaintiffs 
would have to satisfy some additional burden to show that holding the 
company liable for marketing this particular weapon is consistent with the 
Second Amendment, perhaps through the application of means-end 
scrutiny.246 On the other hand, if the gun at issue was not common, then no 
Second Amendment scrutiny would be likely, as the suit would not threaten 
core Second Amendment rights. 
A safer alternative design theory presents more complex questions. 
Heller never specified the level of generality to be applied in determining 
whether a weapon is “common,” and few lower courts have expounded 
upon the question.247 Is a court supposed to look to just the general class of 
weapon (handguns), to the specific model (Glock 27), or to the specific 
feature at issue in the litigation (handguns without chamber load 
 
 244.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 245.  Determining whether a gun falls into this category is much easier said than done, however. 
See Jacobs, supra note 187, at 264 n.148, 272–75. 
 246.  For example, almost all courts to have considered challenges to bans on assault weapons 
have concluded that those bans burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment but have still 
upheld them under the applicable form of means-end scrutiny. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n 
v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2015); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 
1244, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
 247.  Jacobs, supra note 187, at 264 n.148. 
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indicators)? In the absence of further guidance on this issue, the Core Right 
Theory suggests that courts should look at whether the proposed alternative 
design feature would significantly impact the gun’s utility for self-defense 
purposes. If it does, then Second Amendment scrutiny may be warranted; 
the core of the Second Amendment right might be implicated if tort law 
required the gun to be significantly less helpful for self-defense. 
Conversely, if the proposed alternative design would have little or no 
impact on self-defense, core Second Amendment rights would not be 
implicated and the court could evaluate the proposed alternative design in 
the same manner as it would in any design-defect case.248 
C.  NUISANCE 
Nuisance law could also intersect with the Second Amendment. An 
action for nuisance can either be based on a public nuisance or a private 
nuisance.249 “A public nuisance consists of an unreasonable interference 
with the exercise of a right common to the general public,”250 whether or 
not the defendant’s creation of the nuisance arises from the use of real 
property, whereas a “private nuisance is confined to situations where one 
person’s property use interferes with another’s use of neighboring or 
adjoining property.”251 Both types of nuisance actions may implicate the 
Second Amendment. Public nuisance actions have been brought against 
gun manufacturers and dealers under the theory that they have either 
deliberately or negligently allowed guns to fall into the hands of people 
who are prohibited from owning them, such as juveniles and felons.252 
Private nuisance actions have sometimes been brought against firing ranges 
 
 248.  Lawsuits brought by gun owners involving breaches of warranty or implied warranty are less 
likely to be subject to Second Amendment scrutiny, even if the breach of warranty involves a common 
gun or a gun feature that implicates self-defense. That is because such an action would arise under a 
contractual relationship into which the gun manufacturer willingly entered. As the contract guidepost 
shows, when a party willingly enters a contract, it has far less ground to complain that the contract 
violates its constitutional rights. See supra Part II.A.3. Moreover, suits for breaches of warranty are less 
likely to burden core Second Amendment rights since such suits do not target particular guns as 
completely unfit for the marketplace, nor are such suits likely to impact the self-defense utility of a gun. 
See 77A C.J.S. Sales § 443 (2017) (“A manufacturer’s liability for product defects under implied 
warranty may not be premised on the existence of an obvious hazard in a product which functions 
properly for its intended purpose.”). 
 249.  66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 7 (2017). 
 250.  Id. § 8. 
 251.  Id. § 9. 
 252.  See 84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 109 § 21 (2002). Often, these public nuisance actions have been 
brought by municipalities. See David Kairys, Public Nuisance Claims of Victims of Handgun Violence, 
43 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (2001). However, my focus is on private plaintiffs, since actions by 
municipalities are not really applications of private law but rather are more analogous to direct 
government regulatory action. 
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because of excessive noise and other potential hazards associated with such 
establishments.253 
Actions for public nuisance against gun manufacturers and dealers 
based on those manufacturers and dealers allowing weapons to fall into the 
wrong hands are unlikely to warrant Second Amendment scrutiny. 
Although, as discussed above, the Second Amendment does likely contain 
at or near its core a right to manufacture and sell weapons, that core right is 
specifically limited to people who are law-abiding and responsible.254 An 
action based on an allegation that manufacturers and gun dealers are selling 
guns to people who are not law-abiding (like convicted felons) or otherwise 
responsible (like minors) thus does not target conduct at the core of the 
Second Amendment right. Although some types of criminal record based 
prohibitions on gun ownership may be inconsistent with Heller, these 
prohibitions nevertheless fall outside the core of the Second Amendment 
right,255 and therefore a public nuisance lawsuit based on a manufacturer or 
dealer circumventing those provisions is unlikely to warrant Second 
Amendment scrutiny. 
Actions based on private nuisance against gun ranges present a more 
difficult question. In Ezell, discussed supra in Part III, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the ability to train to use firearms at a firing range is protected 
under the Second Amendment, and that Chicago’s restrictions on such 
firing ranges placed a significant burden on the core of the Second 
Amendment right.256 Although it is true that Chicago also required range 
training in order to obtain a license to own a firearm in the city, the court’s 
conclusion was not entirely based on that requirement. The court 
specifically found that “the right to maintain proficiency in firearm use [is] 
an important corollary to the meaningful exercise of the core right to 
possess firearms for self-defense.”257 Thus, like the right to sell and 
 
 253.  See, e.g., Yates v. Kemp, 979 N.E.2d 678, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (private nuisance suit 
based on the manner in which the defendant operated a gun range); Vermillion v. Pioneer Gun Club, 
918 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (suit against a gun club for private nuisance based on 
“bullets . . . straying onto [the plaintiffs’] property”); Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc. v. Eyrie Shotgun 
Ranch, LLC, 228 P.3d 1134, 1137 (Mont. 2010) (private nuisance suit against a shooting range based 
upon the danger posed by its “close proximity to a subdivision and an elementary school”); Shaw v. 
Coleman, 645 S.E.2d 252, 258 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (finding a shooting range to be a nuisance because 
of, among other factors, excessive noise). 
 254.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  
 255.  Indeed, almost no prohibitions against firearm possession based on criminal conduct have 
been struck down since Heller. See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION 
SUMMARY 14–16 (2017), http://smartgunlaws.org/post-heller-litigation-summary. 
 256.  See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704–06, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 257.  Id. at 708. 
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manufacture firearms, the right to maintain proficiency in firearm use 
through range training is probably part of the core Second Amendment 
right. 
Since nuisance actions often seek the end of the activity targeted, a 
nuisance action against a gun range may trigger some kind of Second 
Amendment scrutiny. The Second Amendment concerns would likely be 
incorporated into the existing framework for nuisance analysis. A private 
nuisance only exists where the conduct complained of is “unreasonable:” 
the conduct’s utility is outweighed by the harm it causes to the plaintiff.258 
In determining the utility of particular conduct, courts look to “(a) the 
social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; 
(b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and (c) the 
impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.”259 In the case of 
firing ranges, courts could consider the value of firing ranges as “an 
important corollary” to the exercise of Second Amendment rights when 
determining their social value. Courts could also consider the availability of 
other firing ranges in the area when thinking about the suitability of a firing 
range to the character of the locality.260 And courts could also avoid 
Second Amendment problems by requiring remedial measures to make 
firing ranges less bothersome to surrounding property owners, or using the 
remedy of damages instead of an injunction. 
The buffer zone guidepost may come into play here since the right to 
be free from nuisances is arguably a stick in the bundle of rights associated 
with ownership of a piece of property.261 However, the limitations on 
nuisance actions described above merely incorporate Second Amendment 
interests into existing (and longstanding) nuisance doctrine. The Second 
Amendment may change some of the considerations that courts look at in 
determining the public utility of firing ranges, but the overall calculus of 
utility versus harm (and the right to bring a nuisance action) remains the 
same. The utility side of the nuisance inquiry changes with the times as 
 
 258.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979). 
 259.  Id. § 828. 
 260.  Cf. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 711 (“[T]he City may promulgate zoning and safety regulations 
governing the operation of ranges not inconsistent with the Second Amendment rights of its citizens.”); 
id. at 714–15 (Rovner, J., concurring) (“The City has a right to impose reasonable time, place and 
manner restrictions on the operation of live ranges in the interest of public safety and other legitimate 
governmental concerns.”).  
 261.  See Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 218–19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“[P]ossessory rights to real property include as distinct interests the right to exclude and the right to 
enjoy, violations of which give rise to the distinct causes of action respectively of trespass and 
nuisance.”). 
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activities that once had utility no longer do, and vice versa.262 The changes 
to the inquiry to protect Second Amendment interests would simply be a 
continuation of that tradition, rather than a new limitation on private 
property rights. Thus, applying the Core Right Theory here suggests that 
the Second Amendment would likely have some application in private 
nuisance actions against gun ranges,263 albeit in a form that would likely 
leave plenty of room for such actions to continue unabated. 
 D.  NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT 
Negligent entrustment and related actions are also an area where the 
Second Amendment could arguably have private law implications.264 
Negligent entrustment occurs when the defendant permits a third person to 
use a thing and the defendant knows or should know that the third person is 
likely to use it to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.265 
There are two theories of negligent entrustment actions involving guns 
that likely have different implications under the Core Right Theory. One 
theory is that a defendant consciously gave or (more often) sold a firearm 
to a person who later hurt someone with it, when the defendant should have 
known that the recipient would do something bad with the firearm.266 
Another theory is that a defendant failed to safely secure a firearm, 
allowing it to fall into the hands of someone who used it to cause harm.267 
As to the first theory, the analysis would probably be fairly similar to 
 
 262.  See George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist 
Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 682, 692–94 (1995). 
 263.  Similar logic would likely apply to private nuisance actions against gun stores and 
manufacturers. 
 264.  Actions for negligent entrustment are specifically exempt from the PLCAA. See 15 U.S.C.  
§ 7903(5)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 265.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
 266.  See, e.g., Shirley v. Glass, 308 P.3d 1, 9–10 (Kan. 2013) (allowing a plaintiff to proceed 
with a negligent entrustment action based on a pawn shop’s sale of a firearm to a convicted felon who 
subsequently used the firearm to murder the plaintiff’s son); Splawnik v. Di Caprio, 540 N.Y.S.2d 615, 
335–36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (allowing negligent entrustment action to proceed where the defendant 
“had reason to know [the recipient of a gun] was likely, because of her depressed mental state, to use it 
in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to herself”). 
 267.  See Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage of 
Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2000). There is some dispute about whether this theory 
technically qualifies as negligent entrustment or is an analytically distinct “negligent storage” theory. 
Compare id. at 1214 n.193 (“Although there is a potential for overlap, the theory of negligent storage 
must be distinguished from the theory of negligent entrustment.”), with 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 78 (2017) 
(“Negligent entrustment can include both affirmative entrustment of a firearm to an unsuitable person 
and failure to properly secure a firearm . . . .”). The distinction is not particularly important for this 
Article’s purposes. However it is classified, the tort requires a failure to adequately store a firearm, 
resulting in someone gaining access to the firearm and injuring themselves or someone else. 
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public nuisance actions based on negligent marketing—there is likely no 
Second Amendment issue if a lawsuit merely targets a dealer for selling to 
someone who is not law-abiding or responsible. Unlike most public 
nuisance actions though, negligent entrustment actions may involve 
transfers to persons who, though not legally barred by a criminal conviction 
from owning firearms, are nevertheless persons who the defendant should 
have known would be likely to do harm with a firearm. For example, in 
Angell v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co., a Florida court found the plaintiff had 
stated a claim for negligence when the defendant sold a gun to the 
plaintiff’s attacker, even though when the attacker entered the defendant’s 
store, “[h]er eyes were glazed and she was laughing and giggling as she 
hugged and kissed one of the employees who was a total stranger to her” 
and she “repeatedly aimed [a gun] at [an employee’s] head, pulling the 
trigger.”268 In cases like this, although the attacker may have been 
otherwise law-abiding, she arguably was not responsible. Moreover, 
restricting gun stores from selling to people exhibiting strange behavior 
arguably also falls under Heller’s exception for “conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”269 Thus, negligent 
entrustment actions based on deliberate transfers of a firearm to another 
person are unlikely to implicate the Second Amendment. 
The Second Amendment is likely to be more relevant in actions based 
on a theory of failure to secure a firearm that was then taken by someone 
who should not have had access to it. In these cases, tort law imposes a 
duty on gun owners to lock their guns away in a particular manner—the 
same objective as the safe storage law struck down in Heller. The Court 
found that law “ma[de] it impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the 
core lawful purpose of self-defense.”270 As Blocher and Miller point out, if 
courts were to hold that negligence law created the same duty of care for 
gun owners as that required by the law in Heller, that would plainly 
implicate, and likely be inconsistent with, the Second Amendment.271 Thus, 
whatever duty of care gun owners have to keep their weapons secured, it 
must be consistent with the ability to use those weapons for self-defense.272 
 
 268.  Angell v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co., 363 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).  
 269.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). See also Colo. Outfitters Ass’n 
v. Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1074 (D. Colo. 2014) (expressing “grave doubt” that a law 
requiring background checks on all firearm transfers “implicates the Second Amendment’s guarantee at 
all”), vacated, 823 F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 2016).  
 270.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
 271.  Blocher & Miller, supra note 164, at 296–97. 
 272.  By contrast, there would likely be no Second Amendment issue with lawsuits aimed at gun 
dealers who fail to adequately secure firearms. See generally Michael T. Pedone, Note, Valentine v. On 
Target, Inc.: It Is Time to Hold Gun Dealers Accountable for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 60 
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The treatment of safe-storage provisions by courts since Heller 
provides some insight into how courts might harmonize the Second 
Amendment with the duty of care in “failure to secure” negligent 
entrustment cases. The two major cases to have analyzed safe storage 
requirements after Heller both upheld laws requiring firearms to be 
equipped with a trigger lock or put in a safe when not under the owner’s 
immediate control.273 In both cases, the courts distinguished those laws 
from Heller on the grounds that they had an exception for when the firearm 
was in the owner’s immediate control, and therefore allowed the owner to 
use guns for self-defense in the home.274 Using these cases as a guide, 
courts would likely find that negligent entrustment actions could place a 
duty on gun owners to secure their weapons as long as that duty did not 
extend to times when the weapon was in use or under the owner’s direct 
control.275 
E.  PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Private property rights were often at the center of disputes over the 
applicability of other constitutional provisions to private law, and the 
Second Amendment will likely be no different.276 Two different contexts 
for these kinds of disputes have received some attention from the courts 
and in scholarship. First, does the Second Amendment limit the ability of 
property owners to keep guns off their property, even when that property is 
otherwise open to the public? Second, does the Second Amendment place 
any limitations on the ability of homeowners to enforce restrictive 
covenants or homeowners’ association rules prohibiting firearms in 
 
MD. L. REV. 441 (2001) (discussing such claims). Placing a duty on gun dealers to store their weapons 
in a particular way does not impact the right to use arms for self-defense in the home.  
 273.  See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 963–66 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015); Commonwealth v. McGowan, 982 N.E.2d 495, 502–04 (Mass. 2013). 
 274.  See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 963–65; McGowan, 982 N.E.2d at 502–04. 
 275.  At least two Supreme Court Justices have voiced concern with the holdings in these cases, 
because safe storage requirements create a delay in a gun owner’s ability to access a firearm in an 
emergency and therefore burden the right to self-defense in the home. See Jackson, 135 S. Ct. at 2800 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissent). 
However, Heller specifically mentioned that some safe storage provisions could pass muster under the 
Second Amendment. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 632 (“[O]ur analysis [does not] suggest the invalidity of 
laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”). Since “[a]ny law regulating the storage 
of firearms will delay to some degree the ability of a firearm owner to retrieve and fire the firearm in 
self-defense,” it must be that at least some delay is acceptable under the Second Amendment. 
McGowan, 982 N.E.2d at 503. In any case, it is doubtful that the core of the Second Amendment right 
is implicated by a requirement that guns be kept locked up except when under the owner’s control, even 
if such requirements may implicate non-core aspects of the Second Amendment right (e.g., the speed of 
retrieval).  
 276.  See supra Parts I.D & I.E. 
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housing developments? 
The conflict between the Second Amendment and private property 
rights is one of the few areas where a court has actually weighed in on 
Heller’s impact on private law. In GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, the 
Eleventh Circuit considered a challenge to a state law preventing people 
from carrying guns into places of worship without the explicit permission 
of the owner of the place of worship.277 In rejecting that challenge, the 
buffer zone guidepost loomed large in the court’s analysis. The court 
described the well-established colonial and pre-colonial history of the 
private property right to exclude trespassers, and concluded that “[a]n 
individual’s right to bear arms as enshrined in the Second Amendment, 
whatever its full scope, certainly must be limited by the equally 
fundamental right of a private property owner to exercise exclusive 
dominion and control over its land.”278 Much like in the Logan Valley line 
of cases, although business owners may not have an affirmative 
constitutional right to keep guns off their property,279 by refusing to employ 
the Second Amendment to require property owners to allow guns on their 
property, the court protected a breathing space for private property rights. 
The core right guidepost further reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s 
conclusion. As discussed above in several other contexts, the right to carry 
firearms outside of the home, whatever its scope, likely falls outside of the 
core of the Second Amendment right. Even if the right to carry outside the 
home did implicate the core of the Second Amendment, it does not 
automatically follow that a right to carry on private property is a part of 
that core. Moreover, forcing a business to have a gun on its property that it 
does not want there may itself violate the Second Amendment’s core 
principles. Blocher has argued that the Second Amendment protects a right 
“not to keep and bear arms,” because such a right would further the core 
Second Amendment value—self-defense—by allowing people to choose 
whether to accept the personal safety risk associated with a gun’s presence 
on their property.280 Forcing business owners to allow guns on their 
property may or may not violate that right,281 but if the Second Amendment 
contains some right not to bear arms, it likely does not require private 
businesses to allow guns on their property. Finally, the consent guidepost 
 
 277.  GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 2012).  
 278.  Id. at 1261–63, 1265. 
 279.  See, e.g., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding an 
Oklahoma law requiring businesses to allow employees to keep guns in their cars). 
 280.  Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26–31 (2012). 
 281.  See id. at 41–45. 
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plays a role here as well, since businesses often post notices on their 
property indicating that anyone who enters must agree to not carry firearms 
on the premises. If a person freely agrees to bargain away his or her Second 
Amendment rights in exchange for being allowed into a business, courts 
will be unlikely to find a violation of those rights. 
Many housing developments have used restrictive covenants or 
homeowners’ association (HOA) rules to prohibit the possession of 
firearms in homes in those developments.282 Although not yet litigated,283 a 
gun owner challenging such a restriction might argue that it is analogous to 
the restrictions struck down in Shelley.284 The Core Right Theory points 
towards such restrictions receiving some constitutional scrutiny. Such 
restrictions—at least where they completely ban possession of all guns in 
the home—undoubtedly burden the core of Second Amendment. On the 
other hand, a restrictive covenant or an HOA agreement is a property right, 
and any application of the Second Amendment would threaten that 
property right.285 Moreover, HOAs and restrictive covenants are voluntary 
agreements, and they generally receive the deference courts pay to such 
agreements when determining whether to apply the Constitution to private 
law. But, as Shelley demonstrates, when a restrictive covenant or HOA 
directly burdens the core of a right, it may be subject to constitutional 
scrutiny despite the property rights involved and the consensual nature of 
these agreements. As discussed in Part I.E, HOAs and restrictive covenants 
are not like most ordinary contracts because they—by design—impact non-
parties to the original agreement.286 
However, the fact that an attempt to enforce such a “no guns” 
restriction would be subject to constitutional scrutiny is not the end of the 
 
 282.  See John-Patrick Fritz, Comment, Check Your Rights and Your Guns at the Door: 
Questioning the Validity of Restrictive Covenants Against the Right to Bear Arms, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 
551, 551–52 (2007); Christopher J. Wahl, Comment, Keeping Heller Out of the Home: Homeowners 
Associations and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1003, 1003 n.5 (2013). 
 283.  The pressure of threatened litigation may have forced some HOAs to withdraw proposed 
gun bans. See Wahl, supra note 282, at 1003 & n.6. 
 284.  See Fritz, supra note 282, at 551–52 & 565 (making a version of this argument pre-Heller). 
 285.  See, e.g., Leigh v. Village of Los Lunas, 108 P.3d 525, 529 (N.M. 2004) (“Restrictive 
covenants constitute valuable property rights.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although some jurisdictions do not consider a restrictive covenant to be a property right for takings 
purposes, because they consider them to be contractual rights, see id. at 530, contractual rights are still 
an important interest with constitutional dimensions. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State 
shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”). 
 286.  A similar restriction in a lease, by contrast, would likely not be subject to constitutional 
scrutiny. Unlike a restrictive covenant or HOA rule, a lease provision would not have adverse impacts 
on third parties beyond those who negotiated the lease. Instead, a lease would be much more like an 
ordinary contract, and therefore unlikely to receive constitutional scrutiny. 
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inquiry. A court looking at such a restriction would have to conduct a full 
Second Amendment analysis, including selecting an appropriate level of 
scrutiny and applying that level of scrutiny to the restriction at issue (which 
would necessarily include considering the justifications for the restriction 
in that particular development). It may seem obvious that strict scrutiny 
should apply to these restrictions, given their similarity to the law struck 
down in Heller. However, the fact that these restrictions emanate from an 
agreement among private parties, and that a prospective home purchaser 
who wishes to use firearms for self-defense may simply choose to live 
elsewhere, may lessen the burden on the Second Amendment and counsel 
in favor of a lower level of scrutiny, even though these same factors would 
probably not be sufficient to shield such restrictions from all scrutiny. 
Thus, while the Second Amendment would likely apply to such 
restrictions, that does not automatically mean they would be unenforceable 
in all circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
The Core Right Theory provides a sound framework for understanding 
courts’ approach to questions about the intersection of private law and 
constitutional rights generally. Consequently, applying that theory guides 
our understanding of how courts may address these intersections in the 
Second Amendment context. However, the Core Right Theory is only 
explanatory; I make no claims about its normative value. The Second 
Amendment’s post-Heller development presents courts and scholars with a 
unique opportunity to look at old doctrines in a new light, and the way that 
constitutional rights and private law are integrated may be one area that 
deserves a fresh look. But in order for that to happen, we must first develop 
a coherent understanding of what courts have done in this area up to this 
point. The Core Right Theory provides an important tool for moving in that 
direction. 
 
